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Abstract
The main purpose of this dissertation is to design an appropriate tariff program for resi-
dential customers that encourages customers to participate in the system while satisfying
market operators and utilities goals. This research investigates three aspects critical for
successful programs: tariff designs for DR, impact of renewable on such tariffs, and load
elasticity estimates. First, both categories of DR are modeled based on the demand-price
elasticity concept and used to design an optimum scheme for achieving the maximum
benefit of DR. The objective is to not only reduce costs and improve reliability but also
to increase customer acceptance of a DR program by limiting price volatility. A time
of use (TOU) program is considered for a PB scheme designed using a monthly peak
and off peak tariff. For the IBDR, a novel optimization is proposed that in addition to
calculation of an adequate and a reasonable amount of load change for the incentive also
finds the best times to request DR.
Second, the effect of both DR programs under a high penetration of renewable resources
is investigated. LMP variation after renewable expansion is more highly correlated with
renewable’s intermittent output than the load profile. As a result, a TOU program is
difficult to successfully implement; however, analysis shows IBDR can diminish most of
the volatile price changes in WECC. To model risk associated with renewable uncertainty,
a robust optimization is designed considering market price and elasticity uncertainty.
Third, a comprehensive study to estimate residential load elasticity in an IBDR pro-
gram. A key component in all demand response programs design is elasticity, which
implies customer reaction to LSEs offers. Due to limited information, PB elasticity is
iii
used in IBDR as well. Customer elasticity is calculated using data from two nationwide
surveys and integrated with a detailed residential load model. In addition, IB elasticity is
reported at the individual appliance level, which is more effective than one for the aggre-
gate load of the feeder. Considering the importance of HVAC in the aggregate load signal,
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1 Introduction
Ongoing developments in the so-called Smart Grid promise a future power system that
is more economically efficient, environmentally friendly, fault resilient and operationally
flexible. This future system will depend on new digital communications, computing,
monitoring and controls down to the customer level. Among the many innovations related
to these developments, a key component is effective demand side management.
In a conventional electric power system, the main objective is to control the supply
to meet the demand. However, the demand side could change its passive role in a new
modern grid via Demand Response (DR). Note that DR is not energy efficiency. Energy
efficiency refers to actions taken to permanently reduce the energy consumption of goods
and services, for example insulating a home, switching to more efficient appliances, and
Figure 1.1: Schematic of smart grid system
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Figure 1.2: Design capacity of power grid in compared with yearly load
tuning a commercial heating, air conditioning, and ventilation (HVAC) system [3].
The electric power gird is typically designed with large margins to support the peak
period of energy consumption, which only happens for a few hours each year [1, 2].
Generator owners or utility companies have been required to increase their generation
capacity at all times only to meet these infrequent peak demands. Generally, around
20% of the power generation capacity is only for supplying the peak demand, for say„
approximately 5% of the time [4]. Fig. 1.2 shows this concept graphically. The red line
in this figure is the design capacity of generation in grid vs. the load variation in whole
year using data of PJM in 2012.
To overcome these issues, there are three main options available: building new power
plants, developing new storage technologies, or developing DR programs [5, 6].
Building new conventional power plants is not always appropriate due to the added
costs and increasing environmental pollution by using fossil fuel based peaker units [1, 2].
In addition, adding new generators only solves the problem over a short period of time
considering the growth rate of the demand [7]. Energy storage could be one of the
most important aspects of the future smart grid that could supply peak load as well as
by providing new functions, such as, ancillary services [8]. The most popular forms of
energy storage are pumped storage, flywheel, compressed air, electrical vehicle batteries,
and large thermal storage tanks. However, the technology for most of these energy storage
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types remains at the research level with high costs or other restrictions limiting large scale
deployment [9, 10].
Both of the above solutions are based on the traditional idea of controlling supply to
match the demand. DR on the other hand is trying to reach to the same goal by managing
the demand. DR helps utilities and market operators to reduce peak demand instead of
increasing generation. It will allow customers to play an active role in the market that
was impossible historically [11, 12].
Design and implementation of DR connect to two other important concepts: power
markets and demand elasticity. These are explained in more detail in the following
subsections. In addition, as one of the main application of DR is under high penetration
of renewable energy resource (RER), characteristics of RERs are reviewed.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Power Market
In a regulated market, utilities own or control the entire flow of electricity from generation
to end-user. States with this type of market in the U.S. include Idaho, Kentucky, Florida,
Colorado, and Tennessee [24]. Deregulation began in the 1970s after the passage of the
public utilities regulatory act. The real market was opened in 1992 after the energy policy
act, which canceled the limitation on the price that would be charged by the wholesale
market. Deregulation has continued to expand since then but has slowed down in recent
years [24]. In a deregulated market, utilities are generally only responsible for:
• distribution, operations, and maintenance from the interconnection at the grid to
the meter,
• billing customers; and
• acting as the provider of last resort.
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In deregulated markets, Independent System Operators (ISOs) administer the wholesale
market to guarantee the reliability and economic operation of systems. In the U.S. several
states have joined the deregulated market over the last 20 years, mainly in the Northeast,
Mid-Atlantic, Texas, and California [25]. From economic point, electricity is a commodity
that could be bough, sold, and traded. The electricity market is a structure which enables
this trade in short term and long term through the bids and offers from sellers and buyers.
Bids and offers use supply and demand convention to set the price [13]. The transactions
in the wholesale market are typically cleared by ISOs which try to keep the balance of
supply and load while maintaining the economic efficient of market operation as well.
The market for energy products trading is normally cleared by ISOs in 5, 15 and 60
minutes intervals [14, 15]. Power related products are also traded in wholesale market
in order to ensure the reliability of the system. These commodities are normally traded
in the ancillary service pool and could include various products, such as, spinning and
non spinning reserve, operating reserve, and regulation up / down reserve [16, 17, 18].
While energy and power products are the major components of the electricity market,
there are also some other products, including those for transmission congestion, electricity
futures and options. Recently, California ISO is running a market to trade imbalance of
renewable energy and power.
To estimate the price of the market at each delivering point, the method that most
ISOs use is called Locational Marginal Price (LMP). In this method, an optimization is
designed to find the price for supplying one additional kWh demand at a bus using a
hypothetical incremental cost of the re-dispatch of available generators, considering the
network constraints [19, 20]. In the market based on above pricing structure, generators
and customers should submit their bids and offers one day in advance and ISO would
run a security constraint optimization to find the least cost dispatch arrangement which
ensures n-1 security as well. The ISOs must always ensure reliability of the system as the
first priority and then consider economic aspects. It means that if there is transmission
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line congestion, ISOs cannot allow more power flow on the line, although there could be
cheaper generation on the lower cost side. This restriction will result in different prices
at two ends of a congested line. Unusual patterns can emerge, including where energy is
flowing from the expensive node to the low cost node. If there was no transmission limit,
then nodal price of all neighbors would be the same. [21, 22].
1.1.2 Demand Response
The U.S Department of Energy defines demand response as “a tariff or program estab-
lished to motivate changes in electric use by end-use customers in response to changes in
the price of electricity over time, or to give incentive payments designed to induce lower
electricity use at times of high market prices or when grid reliability is jeopardized” [26].
In a competitive wholesale market where there is a unique pricing structure for everyone,
even a small reduction in demand can result in significant change in the total production
cost of the system [39]. The main example of this condition is during peak load. Al-
though peak periods are short in duration, they force the ISOs to use the most expensive
generators of the system to maintain the load and supply balance and therefore, they
cause significant price change. DR can reduce the load at peak time and not only reduce
the market clearing price, but also limit the exercise of market power by generator owners
[40, 41].
DR entails either shifting electricity use, for example, off peak, resulting in no net
energy savings, or shedding (i.e., curtailing) electricity use temporarily, for example,
during peak hours, resulting in net energy savings but only for a small portion of the
hours in a year. DR programs can take a number of forms . Some examples are listed
below [33, 35, 60]:
• DR can reduce wholesale energy prices and their volatility. In systems without DR,
demand is inelastic. Additionally, when a power system nears its generation capacity,
supply becomes increasingly inelastic. The result is extreme wholesale electricity price
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volatility on days when system demand is high.
• DR can reduce the need for power system infrastructure expansion. Power systems
are sized to provide electricity during the peak hours. Through DR, the peak is reduced
and new investments in power plants and transmission can be delayed.
• DR can limit the use of peaking power plants, i.e., peakers. The peakers are only
used a small number of hours per year, and have high marginal costs, are generally less
efficient than other power plants and have higher emissions.
• DR can improve grid reliability. For example, DR can provide emergency response
to grid contingencies via ancillary services such as spinning reserve.
• DR can provide power system flexibility. Similar to generators and energy storage
devices, it can be viewed as a resource that can provide energy (via demand reductions)
or provide services (via demand reductions and increases) to the grid.
• DRmay be able to provide fast energy balance service, which is specifically important
in a system with high levels of renewable resources.
The literature broadly shows two types of DR: price based (PB) and incentive based
(IB) [26]. PBDR programs pass on the variation of wholesale market electricity price
directly to customers so that they pay for the value of electricity at different times of
the day[27]. PBDR schemes typically considered, include: Time-Of-Use pricing (TOU),
Critical Peak Pricing (CPP), Peak Load Pricing (PLP) and Real-Time Pricing (RTP)
[28, 29], although there are many other possible PB schemes. The main idea behind all
PBDR is that a significant difference between prices in different hours leads customers
to adjust timing of their flexible loads in order to take advantage of lower price periods.
From the load aggregator or utility point of view, peak shaving results in a powerful
approach to peak shave and avoid capacity upgrades.
IB programs include Direct Load Control (DLC), Interruptible/curtail-able service
(I/C), Demand Bidding/Buy Back (DB), Emergency Demand Response Program (EDRP),
Capacity Market Program (CAP) and various Ancillary Service Markets (A/S). These
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Figure 1.3: Different categories of demand response programs
programs offer customers incentives in addition to their retail electricity rate, which may
be fixed or time-varying. Demand reductions are needed either when required for system
reliability or when prices become too high. In percentage terms, IBDR programs provide
about 93% of the peak load reduction from existing DR resources in the U.S. today [30].
Among all IBDR programs, the interruptible load contract (ILC) is the most common ap-
proach for controlled demand reduction. Utilities and regulators have encouraged ILC for
larger loads since 1980s [31]. Peak Time Rebate (PTR) is another type of IBDR program
[32]; however, the rebate paid to consumers is typically very high and does not reflect the
actual supply-demand market conditions. Recently, IBDR becomes more attractive to
researchers and market operators due to the man barriers that face full implementation
of PB programs (see Fig. 1.4).
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Figure 1.4: Barriers to RTP program, source :www.demandresponseresources.com
1.1.3 Demand Elasticity
Deregulation of electricity market in most developed countries, unstable oil prices and
continuing global warming concern have rekindled interest in energy conservation and
demand management to reduce electricity consumption [42]. Demand side management
interest has increased in most electricity markets in recent years due to the considerable
promise for demand modification through DR different programs [43]. A key factor in
proper design of DR programs is the elasticity. Elasticity is a measure of the customer
response to a tariff or incentive signal. Due to the complexity of human behavior, demand
elasticity remains poorly understood but the socio-economic importance of electric con-
sumption supports deeper investigation [45]. Fig. 1.5 shows the price vs. demand curve.
Slope of this curve represents elasticity of demand.
According to economic theory, demand for energy is less responsive to price changes in
compare to the other products. Price elasticity for most of the commodities, including
electricity is negative. Thus, if the price for electricity increases, the demand for it would
be decreased. There are two ranges for price elasticity of the products: elastic and
inelastic. In general, if the absolute value of the elasticity is between 0 to 1, the demand
is called inelastic and if it is more than 1, it considered to be elastic toward price changes
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Figure 1.5: Price-demand curve
[46]. In an inelastic range, a commodity demand change ratio to a given change in the
price is less than 1. The elasticity for electricity is generally inelastic. For example, if
the price of electricity increases by 10 percent with a price elasticity of –0.10, then one
expects demand to decrease by only 1 percent. As an example of elastic demand, home
decoration accessories elasticity is around –2.5, so demand for them would drop by 25 for
price increase by 10 percent. This relationship is pictured in Fig. 1.6.
Figure 1.6: Relation between price and demand for elastic and inelastic demand
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There are generally two types of elasticity coefficients that are used: own and cross
elasticity of a commodity. Own price elasticity of a good is an index of how much
customers would change their demand in response to price changes of that commodity.
The own price elasticity is specifically useful for investigation of long term adjustment of
the product demand toward price changes. Own elasticities are normally negative which
shows the reciprocal relation between the price and demand. Cross elasticity shows how
the customers would substitute one commodity for another, or change consumption due
to that price change. For electricity, cross elasticity is useful to calculate the amount of
load change from an expensive to a cheaper time. Cross elasticities are typically positive
values [47, 48].
The incentive based elasticity of electricity contains important information on the de-
mand response of consumers to financial incentives. Despite the importance, empirical
estimates of the incentive based elasticity are difficult to find. Elasticity is mainly re-
ported for different customer types, such as, residential, commercial and industrial sectors.
However, aggregating all customer responses may lose valuable information and lead to
inaccurate estimation of response to incentives. This may be one explanation for the wide
range of elasticity values found for electricity. Generally speaking, elasticity can be mod-
eled in two ways: through statistical evaluation using historical data or by direct query
of customers with surveys [44]. There have been some attempts to find a more detailed
value for elasticity. For example Guardia et al. [44] clusters residential customer load
profile based on their similarity and report elasticity for each group. There are also some
studies on segmenting elasticity based on demographic information, including: income of
customers, urban or rural area and so on [45, 49].
1.1.4 Renewable Energy Resources
There are variety forms of generation resource classified as “alternative” energy. Gener-
ally, alternative energy divides into two main forms: Renewable Energy Resource (RER),
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such as, wind and solar; and single use resource like biomass and uranium. The use of
RERs has a long history dating back many centuries as people used wind and solar for
much of their energy demand. After the industrial revolution, the extensive use of fossil
fuels widely replaced RERs. Nowadays, due to the environmental damage caused by
fossil fuels, interest has returned to RERs [50]. Utilities and grid operators around the
world are adopting RERs [53, 54]. There are significant advantages to using RERs. The
main one is decreasing the environmental pollution. The nuclear power plants are not
considered fully renewable due to their toxic and radioactive waste product. Still, nuclear
power has its proponents and some consider it much cleaner than coal power plants [51].
Another advantage of RERs is their availability in isolated and remote areas where de-
livering fossil fuels is expensive. Wind, solar and biomass are available in almost all rural
areas and producing energy from them is more convenient than building infrastructure
for transport of gas and oil. For populated city areas, using conventional power sources is
still more economic than RERs. Still, considering the harmful effects of fossil fuels, even
urban areas will move toward more clean energy. Recently, roof top photo-voltaic panels
has been growing rapidly with excess energy sold at parity back to the grid [52, 55].
Unfortunately, despite continuing advances in technology, there are still significant
financial barriers against the extensive deployment of RERs. One of the important draw-
backs is large investment cost of wind and solar in comparison with expansion or main-
taining the current conventional power plants. In addition, installing large solar panels
or wind farms to produce a huge amount of energy needs a great area of land which is
a challenge in large cities [56]. Another major barrier for RERs is intermittent output.
Wind power can be predicted with fairly limited accuracy. Typically, the standard de-
viation of forecast error for a wind farm power is close 10% in the hour-ahead forecast,
15% for 12 hour-ahead and 20% and more in the day-ahead forecasting as in shown in
Fig. 1.7 [57, 58, 59, 60]. Therefore, the integration of wind power introduces additional
uncertainty and a great challenge to system operators.
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Figure 1.7: Comparison of planned renewable output to its actual, day-ahead
1.2 Motivation
The work in this dissertation is inspired by two facts in today’s power system. Firstly, the
large scale integration of RERs especially wind is advancing rapidly. Secondly, demand
response plays an increasingly important role in reliable and economic operation of power
systems and electricity markets. Demand response in this dissertation is mainly focused
on retail customers who can not participate directly in the market. Small customers are
buying electricity from the utility at a constant price. Therefore, they are not aware of
the price variation in wholesale market. Customers flat price vs. market price is shown
in Fig. 1.8. RTP program was proposed based on idea of transferring variation of market
price to retail customers. However, this DR programs faces many practical barriers and
cannot achieve the full potential of DR.
The objective of this research is to design an appropriate DR scheme for small cus-
tomers that can capture maximum potential of load modification, brings benefits for all
participants, reduces market price variation but remains sufficiently simple and practical
for typical customers.Specifically, this research focuses on the IBDR program because due
to disadvantages with PBDR for retail load costumers, including:
• Most customers will need new metering and communication equipment to participate
fully in RTP.
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Figure 1.8: Retail customers flat rate price vs. market variable price
• Many customers and regulators fear that real time pricing will result in increases in
monthly electricity bills.
• Volatility of real-time prices can make it difficult for customers to plan personal or
small business budgets.
• Evidence that when costumers face sudden and significant changes in their monthly
bill, they reduce their consumption temporarily; however over time, periodic fluctuations
in prices are likely to cause consumers to ignore the savings and return to traditional
consumption patterns.
Although the effect of PB programs is also investigated in this research, the main
concentration is on IBDR. For example, as will be shown in chapter 6 and 7, IBDR can be
particularly effective under situations of generator outage and high penetration of RERs.
The key element in well-designed of demand response programs is elasticity. The term
elasticity is representing customers behavior toward price signals (for PBDR) or incentive
payment (for IBDR). According to many psychological studies, customer reaction toward
price increases is different than from incentive offers. PB approaches tend to be viewed
as punishment, while IB approaches tend to be viewed as reward based. Due to lack
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of information, PB elasticity is normally used in investigation of IBDR program design;
however, optimum design of IBDR requires a good customer behavior model. The main
motivation for elasticity estimation in this research is incorporating the correct model of
customers response to the DR design.
1.3 Contribution
Contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
1. A novel optimization is proposed for IBDR design that calculates load change and
incentive along with an optimum threshold for the DR program. This framework
maximizes LSE benefit while satisfying customer comfort constraints. The main
advantage of the optimum threshold estimation is that it eliminates the need for
communication between customers and LSEs and simplifies the planning process.
2. Customer response in IBDR program is carefully modeled, including different load
types (industrial, commercial and small industrial ) and allows the possibility to
model diverse customer behavior.
3. TOU optimization is proposed not only based on economic objectives but with load
variation considered as a separate goal. This gives the ability to control priority of
economic or load variation concerns in DR program design.
4. Application of IBDR for small customers during emergency situations is proposed
considering time scale criteria. It is shown that appropriate design of IBDR can
effectively diminish economic impact of generator outages. To overcome variation
in speed of response for small customers, a new approach generator ranking based
on their economic effect is proposed. Generator outage ordering allows more time
for operators to implement DR.
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5. IBDR is designed for a high penetration of RERs considering uncertainty of market
price and elasticity of demand.
6. Incentive based elasticity of residential customers is estimated using data of two
nation wide surveys and residential modeling toolbox. This elasticity is specifically
designed for IBDR programs to reflect customers behavior toward reward based
programs.
7. Residential elasticity is calculated for the main appliances in a household, consider-
ing the role and share of each appliance in the aggregated load signal. The concept
of distributed elasticity is introduced to the load scheduling problems to allow more
precise IBDR.
8. Residential customers classification is proposed for IBDR program. Customers
segmentation is done using both load level and incentive expectation criteria. This
classification could help utilities to design an appropriate DR program for each
group to increase participation and achieve greater response for lower cost.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
The chapters of dissertation are as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on demand response and elasticity estimation as well
as a discussion of customers segmentation toward different DR programs.
Chapter 3 gives information on the test bed system. WECC 240-bus reduced model
is used as test system in this research to investigate effect of DR programs. Hourly LMP
for one year is calculated and reported in this chapter for two condition, low and high
penetration of RERs.
Chapter 4 concerns IBDR design under various customer flat rate tariffs. Two trigger
points methods are used for implementation of the DR program, constant threshold and
optimum threshold above customers flat rate tariff.
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Chapter 5 introduces a combination of PB and IB program to fully use the advan-
tages of both. These two programs could perfectly fulfill each other limitation and make
optimum scheme of DR program.
Chapter 6 investigates the effect of IBDR during emergency situations. Although
small customers are normally not participant during emergency conditions like generator
outage, this work shows that they could be an effective resource.
Chapter 7 estimates LMP uncertainty due to wind forecast error. Scenario based
economic dispatch is used to find various value of market price corresponding to forecast
error. For scenario reduction, a Design Of Experiment (DOE) approach is used to find
the range of price uncertainty.
Chapter 8 proposes a robust DR model to manage market price and customer response
uncertainty. As shown in this chapter, the TOU program is not appropriate due to high
variation of LMP, but the IBDR could effectively reduce much of the volatility. Strategy
for renewable biding is also discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 9 builds a model for estimation of IB elasticity. Elasticity in this chapter is
reported based on different customer segmentation, first based on consumption level, and
second based on incentive expectation. It is calculated for main appliance usage among
residential sectors.
Chapter 10 discusses the effect of appliance and incentive based elasticity of residential
sector on DR in both low and high renewable production. Using customer grouping
would improve the design of IBDR and brings more benefit for all participants. In high
penetration of RERs, using potential of load shift would diminish the variation of price.
Chapter 11 provides conclusion and future research.
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2 Literature Review
In this chapter available literature on analysis and modeling of different demand manage-
ment programs is reviewed and summarized. First section is an overview of incorporating
DR programs in power market. Different type of DR programs for both large and small
customers would be discussed in this section, following various purpose that each DR is
pursuing. In second part, studies that have been done to estimate elasticity of electricity
are summarized. Last part would be summery of research for customer clustering based
on different objectives of DR programs.
2.1 Overview of Demand Response
DR can play a significant role in maintaining the supply and demand balance using the
flexible part of the load instead of increasing the power plant generation. There are
many players in the market who can benefit from DR, including the transmission system
owners (TSO), distribution system owners (DSOs), retailers and end-customers. DR is
not a new concept, but has been discussed since the deployment of the first electricity grids
in the 1890s, especially with respect to time differentiated electricity rates [138]. Other
DR concepts such as interruptible load management, mainly for industrial customers,
and direct load control, mainly for residential customers, became popular in the 1970s
[139, 140, 141]. Around the same time, international energy crises lead to increased
interest in demand side management and integrated resource planning, in which DR can
play an active part [139, 140].
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In the 1990s, many electricity systems in the U.S. started the process of deregula-
tion/ restructuring, moving from vertical integration to utility divestment in generation
resources and competitive wholesale electricity markets. As the 2000-2001 California
Energy Crisis showed, a competitive wholesale electricity market with an unresponsive
demand side can lead to problems of generation market power [61]. This spurred further
interest in DR, for example,Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) Demand
Response Research Center (DRRC) began several research and pilot projects in 2004
[61].
At a high level, there are three different scenarios for customers to participate in DR
program each with its own benefits and costs. First, customers can reduce their load
consumption at peak time when the price is higher. For example, they could adjust their
thermostat setting during peak times and leave it unchanged during off-peak periods.
This option would save money for the customer but results in some comfort loss [148,
149, 150]. Second, customers can shift part of their demand from peak to off-peak when
the price is cheaper. For example, they could schedule their washing devices for off
peak period. In residential sector, this scenario tends to have less impact on customer
comfort [133, 134, 135]. In the industrial sector, this second scenario is more challenging,
since it requires changes in work schedule and perhaps higher labor costs in order to
work outside normal business hours [137, 142, 143, 144]. Third, customers can use their
own distributed generation, such as, roof top photo-voltaic panels or microturbines. In
this situation, customers have to make the least amount of change in their consumption
pattern but utilities see a significant change in net demand [145, 146, 147]. The first
and second approaches are expanding as costs to implement PB and IB programs have
decreased. Fig. 2.1 shows the comparison between PB and IB programs according to the
appropriate time frame for implementation.
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of DR programs across time frames
2.1.1 Price Based DR Programs
There is extensive literature on PBDR. Jia et al. [62] propose an application of on-line
learning theory tailored to the problem of pricing for retail load customers who participate
in a DR program. Their work considers thermal dynamic loads for which electricity is
consumed to maintain temperature near preferred comfort settings. In [63], an optimum
TOU pricing scheme for use in monopoly utility markets is developed. The optimal
pricing strategy maximizes the societal benefit. C. Vivekananthan et al. [64] propose an
improved RTP scheme for residential customers using smart meters and in-home display
units to broadcast the price and appropriate load adjustment signals. Application of this
program manages overloading problems and voltage issues and ensures both customers
and utilities benefit. In [65], a novel DR program for optimizing power systems electric
vehicle charging load is introduced. In this work, a DR program is proposed based on
three tariff scenarios for different customer groups: standard, single and multi-tariffs. The
results show that using a multi-tariff scheme could save up to 1.5% on utility cost and
7% on customer monthly bills. Gyamfi et al. [66] highlighted customer responsiveness
to TOU, RTP, and CPP programs by considering behavioral issues. They applied these
PB programs in three different countries and show how results vary across regions. In
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Figure 2.2: Time varying price schemes (a) TOU , (b) CPP and (c) RTP
[74], price uncertainty is modeled through robust optimization techniques. They use
a linear optimization to find the hourly load change of the customer in response to
hourly variable electricity price. The objective function is to maximize customer benefit
considering constraints of minimum energy needed, ramping limits at each load level and
so on. Work in [75] argues that price prediction is essential part of any RTP program
for residential load management. Therefore, they propose a simple weighted average
price prediction filter to find the optimal decision coefficient for each hour of a day
for the customers. They test their price prediction algorithm on data from an Illinois
power company from January 2007 to December 2009. Fig. 2.2 shows graphical difference
between three important categories of PB program, TOU, CPP and RTP.
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2.1.2 Incentive Based DR Programs
The literature on IB program is also extensive. Research by R. Yu et al. focused on
the price elasticity of electricity demand where the loads are managed using energy man-
agement controller units. The purpose of the study is to maximize benefit of users by
considering both load and the corresponding real time electricity prices in the wholesale
market [67]. The main goal of research conducted by Pagliuca et al. is to present a new
approach to modeling flexible loads to understand the potential of residential demand
response. The selected demand response option is based on interruptions of appliances
for short periods [68]. Mallette and Venkataramanan investigate financial incentives nec-
essary to encourage plug in hybrid electric vehicle owners to participate in DR programs
[69]. Zhang et al. demonstrate the potential benefits of coupon based DR programs using
numerical experiments. When there is a potential price spike in the wholesale market
based on the ISO information, LSEs would set the initial coupon price. After the LSE
distributes coupon information to the consumers, these consumers can reduce their de-
mand. The LSEs then bid to the ISO with this response and ISO determines the LMP
based on the demand reductions [70]. X. Fang et al [136] used coupon based DR in
conjunction with wind power plants in the system. They present an optimum bidding
strategy model for LSEs considering coupon based DR. In [71], demand curve flattening
and nodal voltage profile impacts are investigated for an IBDR program based on a load
curve from the Punjab State Transmission Corporation Limited in India. Farahani et
al. [72] discuss the effect of DR potential and incentive level to model customer response
in DLC program. They propose six scenarios based on different incentive level at peak
time and DR potential for flat DLC rates. The results show that increasing the incentive
payments increase the percentage of peak reduction and load modification; however, in-
creasing the demand potential has the antithetical effect because of load shifting. Babar
et al. [73] focus on maximizing customer comfort using a demand reduction-bidding
IBDR programs. They use a dynamic programming approach to balance the benefit of
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customers and utilities while managing peak energy consumption. The objective is to find
the least aggregated reduction bids of the customers, which retains reduction of peak load
while bringing benefits to all participants.
2.1.3 Combinations of Price Based and Incentive Based DR
Programs
It is possible to combine PR and IB DR programs in various ways. In [83], it was found
that PB programs would only be effective if an electricity supplier had more customers
than its electric supply capability and could acquire electricity from other power com-
panies/markets. The research shows that the way to gain the most benefits is through
combinations of DR programs to various arrangements in targeted markets. The main fo-
cus of the work by Yang et al. is to quantify the benefits of DR. To conduct this analysis,
a hybrid market structure with different pricing schemes is assumed [84]. Shu et al. [85]
proposed a dynamic incentive strategy in a dual tariff system based on user elasticity and
energy procurement cost analysis. The objective of dynamic incentive strategy is to give
the opportunity to the people who want to participate while guaranteeing profit. The
research by Wang et al. [86] explores the effect of incentive payments over different smart
grid technologies in several utility companies in North America. It is shown how various
incentives affect the success and scalability of smart grid demand response programs. In
Fig. 2.3 summary of DR programs in the literature is shown. This figure illustrates the
impact of DR on market participants, system reliability, market performance and market
operations.
2.1.4 Residential Load Programs
There are several studies that show the residential sector does not respond well to PB
programs. The main reason is that residential customers care more about their comfort
than a small saving on their monthly bill. These also may not fully understand the pricing
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Figure 2.3: Summary of DR benefit according to available literature
scheme in order to react properly. These considerations has lead to specific design of DR
for residential areas.
Hamidi et al. [87] studied DR programs in residential sector to investigate the effec-
tiveness of each PB program. They propose a generic approach based on the appliance
load profile to measure the responsiveness level of customers to various electricity tariffs.
There are only certain types of household appliance whose consumption pattern can be
modified in DR programs. In [76] and [77], this fact is used to design a specific DR for
residential sector. The authors in [77] propose a load management algorithm based on
controllable appliances to adjust the customer’s hourly consumption. The effect on the
network is neglected. If each house tries to maximize its own benefit, the market opera-
tor could face new peak load since every one schedules consumption independently. This
issue is addressed in [78] where authors trie to avoid gaming by household and control
appliances by considering the network. They use a Nash equilibrium approach to obtain
the price and energy usage for each time period in order to minimize the overall energy
cost. Customer satisfaction and comfort level is not included in the formulation. In [79]
and [80], a decentralized optimization based on dual decomposition and sub-gradient mul-
tipliers is used to maximize social welfare. Although customer satisfaction is considered,
these efforts fail to model different types of loads in the customer utility function. In [81],
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Figure 2.4: Schematic of smart home [76]
a message-passing approach is used to develop a decentralized optimization for residential
energy management. The decentralized optimization is based on the alternating direction
method of multipliers.
The authors in [82] present a coordinated home energy management system (HEMS)
scheme where individual houses coordinate with each other for a real-time DR program.
In this study, the economic motivation for both utilities and customers to participate in
HEMS program is evaluated in detail. The proposed HEMS is a dynamic programming
problem solved using a convex optimization based on dual decomposition. The main
focus of this study is on shiftable appliances, such as, washing device and plug-in electric
vehicles. Much of this literature in this area works on the design and control of the Smart
Home. An example schematic of HEMS is shown in Fig. 2.4. In contrast, there is little
effort to understand the impact on the wholesale market. From the market point of view,
there is surprising limited study of retail customers who cannot participate directly in
market. It means the available data and technology for an LSE to design and implement
DR is limited. Therefore real time pricing, customer bidding and dynamic incentives are
difficult to successfully implement for residential customers.
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2.2 Overview of Elasticity Estimation
Numerous studies on price elasticity of electricity have been conducted over the years,
especially during the 1980s and early 1990s when energy prices were rising rapidly and
concerns about energy conservation increased. Electricity demand modeling has been one
of the most heavily studied in energy and has been the subject of a number of surveys
over the last four decades; elasticity estimation is almost always a part of these studies.
Fig. 2.5 shows the frequency of various elasticity values that have reported in different
literature. This figure shows both price elasticity (P ) and income elasticity (Y ) for long
term (Plr, Ylr) and short term (Psr, Ysr). It also shows the values of elasticity from papers
that used a statistical method to estimate elasticities of customers (Pstat, Ystat). Note the
wide variation in estimates.
One of the oldest studies was done by Houthakker [88] estimating demand in the
residential sector for 42 towns in U.K. in 1951. He finds price elasticity not far from unity.
On the other hand, Fisher and Kaysen [89] estimate price elasticity for residential demand
as almost inelastic and close to zero in 1962. The range of estimation for elasticities
various significantly depending on the data set, modeling technique, location, time and
so on. Short run price elasticity range from -2.01 to -0.004 with a mean of -0.35 and
median of -0.28. Long run elasticities estimates vary between -2.25 to -0.04 with a mean
of -0.85 and median of -0.81 [42]. According to empirical estimates, there are three types
of electricity elasticity: long term, short term (less than one year) and real-time (from
TOU studies). In the short term, residential price elasticity is small but it is still greater
than larger customer who have zero price elasticity in short term [45].
Alfaris [90] and C.T. Jones [91] both report short term elasticity around -0.04 in 1990s
using an error correction model and log-linear method, respectively. Jones found higher
elasticity using translog technique on its time series data from 1960-1992. Long term
elasticity reported by Alferis is about -0.82 and it’s -0.207 using both methods in Jones
work. Beenstock et al. [92] estimates long term elasticity in households -0.6 using time
25
Figure 2.5: Frequency of values for short term and long term elasticity [42]
series data from 1973 to 1994. Walters et al. [93] found two different long term elasticities
using log-linear or translog method, one -0.26 and -0.1. Houthakker and Taylor [94]
estimate long run elasticity of United States in the 1970s around -1.89. Holtedahl and
Louts [95] report household long term elasticity in Taiwan around -0.16 using time series
data from 1955 to 1996. The common point between these studies is their estimation for
short run elasticity of about -0.15. M. Filippini [96] and Narayan et al. [97] do not report
separate elasticity for short term and long term but both estimate average elasticity
around -0.3 for Switzerland and Australia, respectively. Bose et al. from India data [98]
and Baker et al. from the U.K. [99] also just estimate on total elasticity for residential
sector that is around -0.7. Flippini and Pachauri studied [103] in 2004 in India estimates
elasticity for urban area in different season, they found less elasticity (-0.29) in summer
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and highest one in monsoon months (-0.51). Lebandeira et al. [45] also found that there is
relation between outdoor temperature and short term elasticity, it shows their short term
elasticity of residential sector which is about -0.25 would change at least by 5% from hot
to cold days. There are also several studies that show price elasticity of electricity close
unity, e.g., Houthakker et al. [100] in 1974 and Kamerschen et al. [101] in 2004 both for
United States residential electricity demand. Halversen [102] found elasticity more than
-1 in Unites States in 1975. Note there are very few papers investigating elasticity for
IBDR. Cabera et al. [104] is one of the few such studies considering different incentive
payments and levels of customer willingness to participate. They do not report any
specific elasticity value.
2.3 Customer Segmentation
Customer classification for addressing appropriate DR signal has been discussed in some
papers. Dam et al. [107] propose a heuristic based approach to select an optimal DR
program from the customer viewpoint. In this study, customers collect information of
different DR program signals and price rates as well as energy supply constraints and
decide whether to accept the DR signal or not. The main barrier against this approach
is the amount of the information that needs to be collected and analyzed by customers.
Aalami et al. [108] develop another approach to select the best DR program based on
multi-attribute decision-making. The model simulates the customers behavior toward
different electricity prices, incentives and penalties. They used this model to prioritize
DR signals using similarity to the ideal solution. The priority list helps the utility and
customers to select the best DR program. Three DR programs were tested in this study,
IBDR programs, PBDR programs, and a combination of both programs.
Gomes et al. [105] proposed a multi-objective evaluation approach to optimize electric
load groups. They grouped the load based on physical and geographical parameters to
control the peak demand at three levels: residence, aggregated feeder and substation.
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The results show that demand could be reduced up to 4.39%, 3.91%, and 7.49% at each
level, respectively, while increasing the average unit profit per kWh by 3.07%. Beal et
al. [106] attempted to improve the load grouping based on a power color algorithm for
stochastic-constraint satisfaction. In this approach, customers can define the flexibility
of different appliances in the house by choosing a color code. Despite various research
on customer segmentation, there is very little work that classifies customers based on
behavior toward incentive signals; however, this kind of classification could greatly help
utilities to design DR for targeted groups.
2.4 DR with High Levels of RERs
A major economic barrier against the large-scale deployment of RERs is the high invest-
ment cost that is needed for backup reserve to ensure the reliable operation of the system.
Stochastic optimizations are one approach to quantifying reserve requirements and eval-
uating effect of RER integration on operation costs. Numerous renewable integration
studies based on unit commitment have been performed recently by Ruiz et al. [109] ,
Sioshansi and Short [110], Wang et al. [112], Contantinescu et al. [114], Tuohy et al. [115],
Morales et al. [116], Bouffard et al., Papavasiliou et al. [117] and Papavasiliou and Oren
[118]. The study of Ansari et al. [119] presents a new stochastic security-constrained
unit commitment for hydro-thermal units considering the uncertainty of load forecast,
prediction of inflows to hydro reservoirs and unavailability of units. The proposed unit
commitment is based on AC model of network. A novel hybrid decomposition strategy
composed of generalized Benders decomposition and outer approximation/equality relax-
ation is also proposed in this study to deal with mix integer and non linearity nature of
the model. Still, these studies mainly focus on the impact of renewable output uncer-
tainty on the power system operation and integration of DR and its valuable potential is
not discussed.
Sioshansi and Short [110] modify the unit commitment model based on the effect of
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DR on uncertainty. Borenstein and Holland [120] and Joskow and Tirole [121]-[122] use
the same approach to see the impact of real time pricing and renewable uncertainty on
unit commitment results. The main portion of flexible demand belongs to deferrable
loads, such as, plug-in electric vehicles, washing devices, and so on. The shiftable load
acts as a storage from the system operator viewpoint. Some research focuses on the unit
commitment formulation to include this flexible part of load. Sioshansi [123] proposes a
unit commitment formula based on co-optimization of electric vehicles and generators.
The proposed model does not reflect the uncertainty of RERs output.
There are fundamental barriers against using DR schemes discussed previously. As
shown in [124] and [125], the demand side bidding needs a real time pricing scheme at
retail level. There is strong opposition against exposing retail customers to the volatility
of market prices. In addition, due to non-convexity of system operating cost, real time
pricing often fails to reflect the true economic value of demand response. Researchers in
[110] show that non-convexity along with dispatch of deferrable resources lead to excessive
start up and minimum load costs. An alternative demand response program is discussed
by Hirst and Kirby [126, 127], where flexible loads are used to deliver services to the
ancillary services market. In this DR scheme, load aggregators submit bids on behalf
of the loads in an ancillary service market. The load aggregator runs the DR program
under both IB and PB strategies. The possibility of using demand side management
as spinning reserve under high penetration of RERs has also been analyzed [128]. The
current market regulations are not amenable for this kind of DR and regulatory changes
are needed to allow flexible load to provide high reliability products.
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3 Reduced Model of WECC as a Demand
Response Prototype
In this chapter, a reduced model of WECC is described in detail. The WECC 240-bus
model is used as test system throughout this thesis to evaluate different demand response
schemes.
3.1 WECC System Information
Resource characteristics for WECC 240-bus model have been derived from a published
California ISO (CAISO) transmission study data and WECC’s Transmission Expansion
Planning Policy Committee (TEPPC) as follows:
• Hourly time variable loads for 11 areas within the CAISO are derived from [151,
152].
• Hourly time variable output for wind and solar resources, which is aggregate in the
240-bus model, are derived from TEPPC studies. There are three wind farm areas
and one solar power plant in CAISO, as well as 13 wind power plants and four solar
resource outside of CAISO.
• Hourly time variable output for geothermal resources in the CAISO have also been
derived from [151, 152] and are aggregated by utility controlled vs. non utility
controlled geothermal resources. They are placed in the North Bay/Geysers area,
which is the largest concentration of geothermal resources in the CAISO. The output
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of the four geothermal areas outside CAISO are assumed to be constant at 80% of
the maximum capacity based on their average performance.
• Hourly time variable output of biomass generations come from [151, 152]. The
biomass generators are aggregated at three buses in CAISO and it is assumed they
are all under utility control. There are very few biomass generators outside the
CAISO and they are modeled as generic RERs.
• Gas fired power plants have a large share of generation capacity in WECC. They
are modeled as dispatchable resources using their heat rate data derived from the
published CAISO transmission study and TEPPC online data. The required in-
formation to run a full unit commitment is not available but basic assumptions in
CAISO are made. For example, the minimum output of gas generator is assummed
to be 5% of maximum capacity.
• Coal power plants in CAISO area assumed to be at 85% of their maximum output
constantly based on overall performance data.
• There are two nuclear power plants in CAISO area and two outside. All are assumed
to run at 100% of capacity since they are based-loaded; however, their output can
be reduced to 90% if needed for congestion management.
• Generation capability of hydro power plants mainly depend on available water stor-
age, which changes month by month. Scheduling and dispatching of hydro units
also depends on environmental requirements limiting ramping and release due to
criteria , such as, fishing management, recreation, irrigation rand so on. These con-
siderations make the process of hydro optimization complex. In this study based
on actual data in [152], hydro power plants are modeled as dispatchable units with
maximum capacity of 87% after accounting for reserves and a minimum output of
20%. The maximum hourly ramping is considered to be 10% of capacity.
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3.2 Load Serving Entities within WECC
In this thesis, target customers are primarily residential. Therefore, the regulatory struc-
ture for LSEs and their retail customers is critical. There are different types of LSE
structures and different terminology used including, load aggregator, electricity utility,
distribution company and so on. In any case, an LSE main functional is to supply elec-
tricity t
o customers. In general, an LSE participates in the market to serve either an entire
distribution area or groups of customers through an arrangement with the actual distri-
bution company. Distribution companies operate the physical infrastructure incluiding
the lines, metering and so on. For purposes of this thesis, the main characteristics of an
LSE is:
• An LSE operates within a territory, although they may operate in in more than
one area.
• An LSE has tariffs (rate plans), which are central and unified for most of their
customers.
• An LSE purchases power in the power markets for the individual customers.
The 129 load buses in the WECC model are divided into 14 regions. It is assumed
that each region belongs to one LSE that serves all buses in the region with the same
tariff and each load bus is an aggregator for the retail load customers served by the bus.
Geographical positions of these regions are shown in Fig. 3.1.
3.3 Unit Commitment in WECC
Unit commitment process at wholesale power market determines the status of each gen-
erator and their scheduled output for the next market window. Unit commitment is
essentially an optimization problem to minimize production cost considering operational
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Figure 3.1: Geographical map of WECC regions



















Gmini uit ≤ Git ≤ Gmaxi uit (3.2b)
Git +Rit ≤ Gmaxi (3.2c)
0 ≤ Rit ≤ uit(RUiΓ ) (3.2d)
NG∑
i=1
Rit ≥ Rmint (3.2e)
Git −Gi,t−1 ≤ RUiui,t−1 +Rstarti (uit − ui,t−1) (3.2f)
Git −Gi,t−1 ≥ −RDiui,t−1 −Rshuti (uit − ui,t−1) (3.2g)
Rstarti = maxRUi, Gmini (3.2h)






GSFkjDjt ≤ Fmaxk (3.2j)
The objective of unit commitment problem is to minimize the system operation cost,
which consists of fuel cost, start up cost and reserve cost. The constraint (7.2) ensures
the balance between supply and demand. The generation capacity constraints (4.3a) and
(10.2f) limit the amount of power and reserves that can be supplied by a generator. The
constraint (10.2g) reflects the maximum spinning reserve from a generator. The constraint
(3.2e) requires at least certain amount of spinning reserve to be provided for the system.
Constraint (3.2f) and (8.5) are the ramp rates of generators. The transmission flow limits
are approximated by the DC power flow (3.2j).
There are limitations in performing a complete unit commitment on the WECC data
in this thesis. Primarily, limitations arise as the ramp rate and start up and shut down
costs for all generators is not known. Thus, the unit commitment in this study depends
more on the generator cost functions. Still since the units are aggregates in any case,
this is probably a reasonable approximation. The main impact would be on coal and
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nuclear power plants since they have lower ramp rates and hydro since here is assumed
hydro is highly constrained by other factors. The reserve requirement is assumed to be
a constant 5% of load at each hour to be provided by gas turbines with their high ramp
rate. As a result, coal, nuclear and hydro power plants are essentially base loaded. Gas
turbines can be shut down or started up to adjust load-power balance and provide reserve
requirements. These assumptions are consistent with the original data that has a unit
commitment solution for each hour from the actual data.
3.4 Economic Dispatch in WECC
Economic dispatch is performed by the market operator in various time windows, e.g.,
next 5 or 15 minute interval. In this process, the status of generator defined by unit
commitment does not change, but instead scheduled MW is updated using more accurate
load forecast data. The general formulation of economic dispatch without considering























GSFkjDjt ≤ Fmaxk (3.4c)
Economic dispatch determines the optimal dispatch of a set of committed generating
units to supply the forecasted load. The objective function is to minimize the operating
cost of generators. The constraint (7.5a) ensures the balance between supply and demand.
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The generation capacity constraint (8.14) limits the amount of power that can be supplied
by a given generator. The transmission flow limits are approximated using DC power
flow in (8.15). Economic dispatch as formulated here is a continuous convex problem and
can be solved efficiently by various nonlinear programming techniques.
In this thesis, the problem is solved using the MATPOWER toolbox. MATPOWER
is a package of MATLAB M-files for solving power flow and optimal power flow prob-
lems. MATPOWER is initially designed for researchers and educators in academic level
considering its simplicity and capability of modification by end user. MATPOWER was
developed by Ray D. Zimmerman, Carlos E. Murillo-Sánchez and Deqiang Gan of PSERC
at Cornell University under the direction of Robert Thomas [155].
3.5 Renewable Resources in WECC
There are several factors that impact the future wholesale power market, including: the
price of natural gas, any costs for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and RERs development.
Such factors effectively change the variable cost of the generator operations and thus, the
market price. Consequently, market price analysis under renewable expansion is one of
the main concerns of this thesis.
3.5.1 Current potential of Renewable Power Plants
In 2004 (the year for which the base data was known), there were 8000 MW of installed
RERs including wind, solar, geothermal and biomass in the WECC model. This repre-
sents less than 10% of the total energy required to serve load in the WECC controlled
Grid. Wind resource has the biggest share in the total renewable generation and led
to the greatest operational challenges. The output of the wind generators is extremely
variable. In California, the highest wind output was during the off peak period. Tab. 3.1
shows information of RERs potential in 2004, including their geographical location and
maximum capacity.
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Table 3.1: Information of Renewable power plants in WECC
Bus number Generator Category Max Capacity (MW) Region
126 BRIDGER Wind 248 Rocky Mt.
130 COLOEAST Wind 597 Colorado
133 CORONADO Wind 240 Southwest
136 COULEE Wind 240 Northwest
138 DALLES21 Wind 375 Northwest
144 FULTON Geothermal 965 Geysers
157 HUMBOLDT Biomass 53 Humboldt
158 HANFORD Wind 174 Northwest
161 IMPERIAL Solar 117 Imperial
166 JOHN DAY Wind 976 Northwest
169 MALIN Wind 240 Northwest
174 MESA CAL Wind / solar 1660 PG&E
178 MIDPOINT Wind 236 Idaho
191 MONTA G1 Wind 190 Bay area
201 PITSBURG Wind 690 Northwest
206 ROUND MT Biomass 314 PG&E
216 TESLA Biomass / wind 472 PG&E
220 VALMY wind 50 Nevada
223 WCASCADE Wind 215 Northwest
227 CMAIN GM 20 Wind 420 BC
3.5.2 Expansion of Renewable Power Plant
Under California’s existing renewable portfolio standard, utilities must supply at least
30 percent of all electricity for retail customers from approved renewable resources by
2030. The majority of required renewable generation to meet the portfolio standards
will come from wind farms and solar. The intermittent output of these resource will
make the operation of electric power system more challenging. Coal power plants are the
main source of CO2 emission, and therefore, they are the first target of retirement from
renewable expansion. In the WECC 240-bus reduced model, there are 7 buses that have
both coal and renewable power plants. In this study, RERs at these buses is expanded
to reduce coal power plant capacities. Current and expanded capacity of RER on these
buses is shown in Fig. 3.2.
Expansion of renewable power plants is proportional to their current capacity with
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Figure 3.2: Capacity of RERs before and after expansion
the same hourly variation within one year. This means higher production in off peak
and less production at peak. In Fig. 3.3 and Fig. 3.4, new renewable capacity compares
with previous coal production is shown for Feb. and July, respectively. During Feb.
and similar winter months, expanded output of RER generally exceeds earlier coal power
production. This means, in these hours, LMP will decrease because of higher availability
of cheap power. In the July and similar summer months, on the other hand, expanded
renewable output is less than the existing coal production. Therefore, it is expected that
LMP will increase at these hours due to reduced power capacity.
3.6 LMP Characteristics in the WECC Model
LMP in the various regions of WECC are investigated under two different scenarios:
2004 reference and high penetration of RERs. The reference case is the original load
and production data of 2004 while high penetration of renewable case is as detailed in
sec. 3.5.2. In the reference case, most regions have a summer peak. Thus, summer months
LMPs are higher on average with a greater standard deviation. A few regions have winter
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Figure 3.3: Renewable expanded capacity in compare with Coal in Feb.
peak load, such as, Rocky mountain and Northwest. However, the variation of LMP in
these regions, especially in the Northwest, is relatively small. The main reasons are the
relatively high industrial loads and reliance on coal power production. After renewable
expansion, LMP changes depend on time of the year, region, location of congested lines
and higher residential load. Generally, we observe three various particular periods:
• High load and low RER production: this occurs for most of the regions in summer
especially during peak hours that lead to higher LMP relative to pre-retirement of
coal units.
• Low load and high RER production: this relates to moderate weather conditions
in spring and fall where residential load is considerably reduced but wind power is
significantly higher. Since the RERs are modeling as “must take,” this condition
leads to considerably lower LMP and at times negative during off-peak hours.
• Moderate load and moderate RER production: while this condition may arise in any
season, it occurs most frequently on winter days. Effect on market price depends
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Figure 3.4: Renewable expanded capacity in compare with Coal in July
on the similarity of RERs output to the old coal capacity. For some regions in
winter months, the average LMP increases after RERs expansion and for others it
decreases.
LMP variation in all regions and during the whole year increase after renewable expansion
due intermittent output of RERs. LMP changes in east regions of WECC, that are closer
to renewable power plants, are greater relative to western regions. In general, LMP
variation becomes correlated with renewable generation profile rather than load profile.
In Tab. 3.2 monthly average and standard deviation of LMP are shown for several regions.
Case 1 refers to renewable expansion and case 2 is the reference case.
In Fig. 3.5, Fig. 3.6 and Fig. 3.7, LMP of one bus of LADWP, Nevada and San Diego
is plotted to show more detail. In August for most of the hours, LMP increases after
renewable expansion and is more salient at peak hours. As another example, Idaho in
February is selected since it is close to RERs and has light load in winter. Mainly LMP
decreases in this situation. Still, the LMP has a significant number of hours with negative
LMP due to over-generation. In chapter 7, it will be shown how to overcome this problem
if renewable bid into the market instead of deployed as “must take” resources.
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Figure 3.5: LMP variation in LADWP during August
3.6.1 Renewable Bidding Strategy
As of today, most power systems operate under a “use all available wind generation” policy
- the so-called “ must take” strategy. This approach can result in increased volatility in
market prices, as shown in previous sections. Another challenge is over generation leading
to negative LMP. Some researchers have proposed bidding strategies for wind generation.
This should help with both negative LMP and high volatility of prices while it may lead
to wasting some amount of RERs production. Fig. 3.8 shows market price variation for
the two cases of “must take” and bidding. The bids are assumed for simplicity to be 0
for all MW output of wind. Thus, the main effect of bidding is to avoid negative prices
due to over generation Results are plotted for April which has highest amount of excess
wind power and consequently highest number of hours with negative LMP.
3.6.2 Effect of Congestion on LMP
Most research considers renewable expansion in conjunction with transmission expansion
due the necessity of having sufficient capacity to transfer renewable power to other areas.
Two examples are shown in Fig. 3.9 for October. During this month, price differences are
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Figure 3.6: LMP variation in Nevada during Feb.
significant. There are regions which have negative LMP most of the time, while other
regions have very high LMP. As shown in Fig. 3.9, the buses with significant price differ-
ence are located across two sides of a congested line. Effect of transmission congestion
on market price is not specific to renewable expansion; however, if renewable output in-
creases in the system, transmission limits will likely be more of a concern. This thesis
does not explore impact of transmission impact in detail except to illustrate how DR may
help alleviate such problems.
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Figure 3.7: LMP variation in San Diego during March
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Table 3.2: LMP change in some regions before and after renewable expansion
Southwest Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
average 1 20.5 20.8 20.1 18.3 31.6 34.2 44.0 44.0 36.2 21.9 23.2 25.1
average 2 25.2 23.7 22.3 22.4 28.0 33.9 43.3 41.1 35.6 23.4 26.2 29.3
std 1 9.8 8.3 10.9 9.1 11.8 11.9 21.5 21.5 15.2 8.3 11.3 13.7
std 2 4.6 3.8 5.0 5.9 9.1 11.9 15.7 15.8 11.2 7.1 4.9 5.0
Bay Area
average 1 31.9 30.2 30.5 28.2 34.8 36.1 41.7 41.7 36.6 29.1 34.1 36.6
average 2 30.6 27.4 28.3 28.7 30.4 32.0 36.0 35.3 32.9 28.4 28.4 29.4
std 1 7.1 6.6 7.6 7.5 7.2 8.1 13.7 13.7 11.1 5.5 8.9 11.0
std 2 6.6 3.4 4.9 4.8 6.4 6.7 8.9 10.1 8.3 4.9 4.2 4.9
PG&E
average 1 34.9 33.8 34.2 28.0 51.1 53.1 70.4 70.4 50.6 29.3 36.5 44.5
average 2 29.3 26.7 26.2 26.3 30.9 36.7 51.4 49.2 38.6 27.9 27.1 29.1
std 1 13.1 13.8 13.4 10.3 25.7 28.8 40.1 40.1 31.3 6.4 12.8 18.7
std 2 5.2 4.2 3.0 3.6 7.9 14.9 25.4 38.0 20.9 5.4 4.3 5.8
Northwest
average 1 29.7 26.5 25.7 25.5 25.3 25.4 25.3 25.3 25.5 26.2 51.9 44.2
average 2 28.5 25.1 25.2 25.3 25.0 25.0 24.9 25.0 24.9 25.1 25.1 25.2
std 1 13.9 2.4 1.8 3.6 0.7 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.1 45.3 34.1
std 2 12.3 0.3 0.8 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.3
Rocky Mt.
average 1 16.6 16.2 22.7 15.8 32.7 36.6 46.2 46.2 33.8 19.5 20.0 25.5
average 2 25.4 23.7 21.2 21.1 26.1 29.3 36.7 34.1 32.3 22.2 22.8 25.1
std 1 14.4 12.5 14.8 12.0 14.1 16.0 21.2 21.2 23.6 11.6 15.2 17.1
std 2 5.5 5.9 7.6 7.9 8.5 7.9 17.6 10.7 13.2 8.9 7.3 5.9
Idaho
average 1 8.0 9.1 17.8 9.3 29.0 32.4 41.1 41.1 28.2 15.0 14.4 19.5
average 2 24.9 23.0 19.9 19.7 24.5 26.1 31.6 29.0 29.7 20.6 21.7 24.1
std 1 18.7 15.8 17.0 17.2 14.5 13.2 16.1 16.1 17.8 15.4 19.7 22.4
std 2 6.3 7.3 9.6 9.8 9.1 6.7 12.3 6.2 11.2 10.4 9.0 6.6
Nevada
average 1 21.4 21.2 26.3 18.5 41.6 45.1 59.6 59.6 42.0 22.2 24.6 32.2
average 2 26.3 24.9 22.6 22.6 28.5 33.4 45.0 41.9 36.6 24.3 24.4 27.1
std 1 13.2 12.6 14.2 10.9 20.4 22.0 30.5 30.5 25.3 10.2 14.0 17.0




Figure 3.8: LMP variation in San Diego
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a) Line 8-63 (limit 1500 MW)
b) Line 215-107 (limit 840 MW)
Figure 3.9: LMP on two edge of congested lines - October 15th
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4 Optimal Incentive Based Demand
Response
In this chapter, the design and formulation of an optimal IBDR is developed relative
to real time prices so that the full benefits of DR can be achieved. Specifically, we
propose a method to design the optimal IB program considering historical generation
and load patterns. The objective is ensuring reliability of the grid and reducing the
generation cost, as well as, increasing the customer acceptance for DR programs. While
there has been increasing interest in PB programs with the installation of smart meters,
residential customers have generally not welcomed these programs. On the other hand, IB
programs struggle to realize a specific objective, e.g., reduced generation costs or improved
reliability. Instead, the incentives are an indirect method that hopefully improves system
performance under a variety of metrics. The main concept of IBDR is straightforward,
a customer would simply be offered a specific incentive payment at a high price time
for a small change in their consumption. Still, there are some fundamental questions in
order to design an appropriate IBDR scheme. The load change required at each time
and appropriate incentive need to be determined. We formulate this as an optimization
problem in this chapter.
4.1 LSE Objective for DR Design
LSEs main responsibility is to provide electricity for retail customers, such as, residential,
small commercial or industrial loads. They can participate in the various wholesale
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market trading pool on behalf of their customers and purchase electricity with time
varying price, although they mainly sell it to their customer through a set of relatively
fixed tariffs or flat rate prices. LSEs benefit is defined according to the difference wholesale






Dbt(P 0b − LMPbt) (4.1)
LSEs profit depends on the flat rate price that it can charge (carefully regulated) so as
to cover LSEs fixed and variable expenses. In sec. 4.4 we will explain more about various
possible tariff scheme for customers. It is easy to see directly from (9.1) that LSE earns
profit whenever the charged price is higher than market price and loses money at other
times, but this does not account for the demand response. Technically, DR programs
achieve benefits by changing the loads. Thus, the LSE objective function to design an















∆Dbtj = gjP incbt (4.3c)
As it shown in (4.3a), total load change at each time is the summation of different
customer types: residential, commercial and industrial. This segmentation helps to reflect
different characteristics of these groups. The parameter gj reflects the response of the
customer when offered an incentive payment. Under the assumption of linear demand
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curves, equation (10.2g) can be explicitly expressed as:
∆Dbtj = εjP incbt (4.4)
4.2 Optimum IBDR Design
The important design parameter to address is the appropriate time to implement DR.
LSEs lose money whenever market price is higher than the flat rate price, but in our
approach we also seek not to ask for frequent load changes. We select a specific value
above market price to serve as a trigger point for requesting DR. This threshold could be
either fixed for the year or seasonal or optimally calculated for each period of study. A
constant threshold has some merit, not least of which is transparency and simplicity, but
this approach may put too much burden on customers in more expensive periods. Con-
sequently, it’s better to find a variable threshold that provides benefit for all participants
























ui ≤ Tmaxm (4.6e)
ut ∈ {0, 1} (4.6f)
In (4.5), the binary variable ut indicates whether DR is needed. The main advantage
of this method is that we could consider customer comfort as a constraint at in any level
that is desired. In our formulation, the number of hours that IBDR occurs is limited
both daily and monthly.
4.3 Load Characteristics
The affordable load reduction at each hour is limited due to the types of loads. Devices in
the residential and commercial sectors can be divided into three groups: (1) interruptible
devices, whose consumption can be interrupted at a specific time and will not need to be
supplied in the future; (2) controllable devices, whose consumption can be transferred to
another time of day; and (3) critical devices that are so important that no manipulation
of the consumption is generally acceptable.
Based on Tab. 4.1, the main reducible load consists of air conditioning and electric
heating, water heating and lighting. Assuming that 10% of the demand for each device
is reducible and using the load profiles for each device from [157, 158], the maximum
affordable limit of load reduction at each hour can be calculated. The National Energy
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Table 4.1: Classification of common residential electric devises
Interruptible device Controllable device Critical device
Air conditioner Rechargeable tools Oven/ microwave
Space heater Clothes washer TV/DVD player/Games
Water heater Clothes Dryer PC/ laptop/Wifi/ modem
Lighting Dishwasher Coffee maker
pool/ hot tub/ spa heater EHV batter Refrigerator/freezer
Pool filter / pump Printer/fax machine
Modeling system provides a database which is representative of more than 1,486 loaf
profiles for residential, commercial, and industrial sectors (called the RELOAD database).
The database reports based on three types of day for each month, average weekday,
average weekend and a peak day. Using this data an entire year of 8,760 hourly values
can be generated since each day of month typically falls in to one of these three types.
The key component in DR programs, either PB or IB, ones is of demand against price
change or incentive payments. Accuracy of anticipated load reduction and adequacy of
incentive design are highly dependent on elasticity of demand. Full understanding of
electricity demand elasticity remains an open problem. In chapter (8) and (9) explore
estimated elasticity in greater detail. In this chapter, the average elasticity value of 0.1
for residential and commercial sector and 0.05 for residential one is used [159, 160].
4.4 Retail Load Tariff Plans
LSE profit depends on the flat rate price that it can charge so as to cover fixed and
variable expenses. The important question is what’s the best retail load tariff strategy
for implementing DR programs that supports the overall market. There are several
schemes considering various design factors. A constant price for the whole year is the
simplest and similar to a traditional residential rate. Given the large variation between
average LMP in each season though, another simple approach would be to offer a seasonal
tariff. Similarly, a tariff that takes into account the wide differences in prices between
day and night or between weekends and weekdays could be beneficial. Incentive schemes
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Table 4.2: Seasonal and yearly customer tariff in WECC regions
Tariff ($/MWh) Spring Summer Fall Winter Yearly fixed
Southwest 31 51 28 26 35
San Diego 36 54 32 31 40
LADWP 33 54 29 28 35
San Francisco 36 46 34 32 35
Bay area 34 43 33 31 34
Fresno 31 47 28 28 35
Cnt. Coast 33 53 29 28 35
PG&E 38 71 34 31 40
Northwest 25 25 25 26 26
Rocky Mt. 28 38 27 26 28
Idaho 27 34 27 26 26
Nevada 35 63 32 28 40
SMUD 29 44 28 27 35
SCE 33 55 30 28 35
with hourly price variations may also encourage customers to reduce consumption in
ways not possible with seasonal pricing. Some of these tariffs would require greater
communication infrastructure and need more initial investment; however, other schemes,
such as, seasonal or day/nigh tariff could lead to useful consumption modification with
existing infrastructure.
In this chapter, IBDR effect on LSE benefit and customer saving, under various retail
electricity tariff is illustrated. Tab. 4.2 shows seasonal vs. yearly fixed tariff in different
regions of WECC. Since most of the regions have a summer peak, the biggest tariff
difference is between summer and other seasons. For some regions that have higher
residential load, the summer tariff is much higher relative to other seasons, like PG&E.
In other regions with light residential load and more coal power or little seasonal variation
in load, there is not a significant difference between the tariffs, e.g., the Northwest.
4.5 IBDR Evaluation with Fix Trigger Threshold Value
In this section, the effect of IBDR on both customers and LSEs in the WECC 240-bus
model is discussed. The trigger point to implement IBDR in this section is set to be
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Table 4.3: LSEs benefit of IBDR program
Region Seasonally fixed Seasonal d/n Yearly fixed Yearly d/n
Low benefit Region (% of benefit change after DR)
SMUD 13.15 26.70 234.85 614.30
Cnt. coast 21.11 62.70 66.06 153.88
Southwest 22.37 74.79 30.91 123.41
SCE 21.12 147.82 119.86 632.31
LADWP 25.72 73.98 157.35 192.49
San Diego 32.62 145.18 24.81 64.11
High benefit Region
Idaho 38.22 186.45 378.18 693.96
Bay area 40.88 236.32 459.44 306.72
Rocky Mt. 41.56 390.38 344.18 539.87
Northwest 52.10 200.52 11.47 115.89
Nevada 63.35 227.13 121.73 360.48
Fresno 85.41 273.59 96.64 371.67
PG&E 86.92 229.00 503.30 612.61
$10/MWh above the fixed price. This means whenever market price is 10$/MWh more
than customer flat rate tariff, LSEs would run a DR program to reduce load. While
numerous approaches for pricing could be designed, we look at for four schemes: fixed
tariff for whole year (yearly fixed), day and night tariff (yearly d/n), seasonal tariff
(seasonally fixed), day and night tariff for each season (seasonal d/n).
Equation (10.1) can be solved to find the desired load change and incentive at each
hour. By reducing the demand, the market price will decrease, so LSEs will benefit from
both a lower price in market and lower demand within their region at expensive hours.
In Tab. 4.3, the benefit for LSEs after DR under various tariffs is shown. The regions
are divided into high and low benefit groups. In this table, the schemes are ordered from
lowest to highest benefit, a fixed tariff for each season brings the lowest benefit for LSEs
while a day/night tariff for the whole year leads to the greatest benefits.
In Fig. 4.1, LSEs net revenue per total load in the high benefit group is shown. Relative
to Tab. 4.3, although there is high difference in terms of benefit percentage between
various tariffs, revenue per total load is relatively comparable. This could justify that
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Figure 4.1: LSEs net revenue per total load after DR in high benefit region
for LSEs, therefore, the DR is not showing much impact under these schemes.
Customer saving after IBDR for the two groups of high and low saving regions are shown
in Tab. 4.4 and the saving per total load change is shown in Fig. 4.2. Customer saving
is only calculated for those who participate in the DR program and receive incentive
payment. As shown in Fig. 4.2, a seasonal fix tariff ranks second order for customer
saving as it was for LSE net revenue per total load. In this case study of WECC, it can
be concluded that a seasonal tariff is appropriate structure of IBDR for both customers
and LSE. The result could be different for different test systems and relates to the LMP
variation at various time scales. In the next section, seasonal tariff is chosen to measure
the effect of threshold and to unify a tariff strategy under both DR plans.
54
Table 4.4: Participating customer saving after DR
Region Seasonal fix Seasonal d/n Yearly fix Yearly d/n
Low Saving Region (% of saving on total bill)
PG&E 35.31 14.08 35.50 0.47
SMUD 45.18 37.13% 46.03 5.67
Nevada 47.83 26.85 50.83 0.73
Fresno 49.44 34.56 54.87 1.44
Cnt. coast 55.46 35.79 61.48 0.21
High Saving Region
SCE 57.40 33.52 63.25 0.23
LADWP 57.74 30.08 63.49 0.11
Southwest 58.44 38.78 65.47 0.08
San Diego 59.37 38.67 67.61 1.76
Rocky Mt. 60.52 48.19 56.76 1.14
Idaho 67.27 69.15 56.78 17.46
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Figure 4.2: Saving per total load change in high benefit region
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Table 4.5: Optimum threshold value in some regions of WECC
Month Southwest Idaho Bay area Fresno PG&E Rocky Mt.
Jan. 3 3.5 7.5 5.5 5 4
Feb. 2.5 2.5 2 1 4 4
March 2.5 1 3.5 1.5 2 2
April 3 1.5 2.5 1 1.5 1.5
May 5 4 2 5 13 5.5
June 17 3.5 3.5 10 15 6.5
July 14 7 5 22 25 13
Aug. 3 6 5 19 20 8
Sept. 3 7 3.5 12 17 5
Oct. 7 3.5 3 4.5 14 5.5
Nov. 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 13 3.5
Dec. 5 3.5 1 5.5 10 5.5
4.5.1 Optimum vs. Constant Trigger Threshold
An optimum threshold for requesting IBDR is investigated in this section using (4.5). The
threshold varies by region from month to month. In Tab. 4.5, results for some regions
are shown. According to these results it can be seen that a constant threshold results
in many DR requests in summer and very few in winter. This unbalance of DR, while
bringing benefits for LSEs, puts a greater burden of inconvenience on customers.
In Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4, the LSEs benefit and customers saving are shown for constant
vs. optimum threshold based on overall utility. The constant threshold brings higher
benefit for LSEs but less saving for customers.
To show that the optimum threshold is in fact the better option in this case, the total
number of hours that DR is requested is shown in Tab. 4.6. As desired, the optimum
threshold limits the number of requests of DR both daily and monthly.
4.5.2 Effect of IBDR on Market Price
In this section, it is shown how each method could help reduce price variations and
peak LMP in the wholesale power market. Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6 shows the LMP monthly










Bay area Idaho Nevada Fresno PG&E
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Figure 4.3: LSEs benefit of IBDR in high benefit region
As shown in Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6, using the optimum threshold has a greater effect on
the monthly average and standard deviation of LMP in the non-peak summer months.
Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8 show the worst day for summer in Nevada as one of the hot regions
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Figure 4.4: Participating customers saving in low benefit region
Table 4.6: Number of hours of load change in some regions of WECC
Total hour of DR Constant threshold Optimum threshold
Region Summer Year Summer Year
San Diego 308 547 290 900
LADWP 311 573 303 947
Fresno 454 784 270 911
Cnt. coast 389 675 292 917
PG&E 1128 2616 836 2540
Rocky Mt. 346 532 328 852
Idaho 175 194 240 783
Nevada 632 1708 510 1539
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Figure 4.8: Worst day in winter in Rocky MT region
60
5 Optimal Use of Incentive Based and Price
Based DR
Each category of DR, incentive based and price based, has its own benefits and takes
advantage of different aspects of the potential for flexible demand. In this chapter, a
combination of both DR categories is proposed as an optimal scheme to achieve the
maximum benefit for DR programs. The goal is to reduce the production cost and improve
the reliability of the network by reducing price volatility. In addition, we suggest high
price volatility negatively impacts residential customer satisfaction and may be indicative
of overall system stress. Thus, DR can be used both to mitigate price volatility and reduce
overall costs.
It has been shown that customers’ attitudes toward PB and IB programs are not similar.
From the perspective of human behavior, “there are two main reinforcement conditions:
reward and punishment, which lead to some significant changes in the subject’s behavior”
[161, 162]. Psychologists mainly believe, in most societies, reward may result in more
considerable improvement for habit development relative to punishment [164, 165]. In
this chapter, a different elasticity value is considered for each DR program to emphasize
this variable response from customers. IBDR as a reward-based system should have
higher elasticity.
The following proposes a combined DR program consisting of both PB and IB pro-
grams. A voluntary IBDR program would supplement the mandatory TOU program to
increase response as needed for reducing peaks that remain after some load shift from
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pricing. Both of these DR programs are regional based, so each region would implement
its DR program individually considering market conditions. Note while load change in
each region may be small, the cumulative effect on prices could be considerable.
5.1 Time Of Use Design
LSEs, or similarly load aggregators, supply electricity for retail load customers, such as,
residential or small commercial and industrial from the wholesale market. LSE’s benefit
is related to the difference of market price and customer price. The LSE selling price must
be regulated since the customer is captive and increasing price always increases profit.
The important question here is what the best retail load tariff strategy is specifically for
implementing a DR program that supports the overall market. This not only affects the
LSE and customer benefits but also directly relates to overall electricity consumption.
Different TOU retail tariffs include peak, off-peak, valley, and so on, each of which could
vary daily, weekly, monthly or seasonally based on the desired simplicity. In this chapter,
a tariff with a peak and off-peak price is considered that changes every month, which
provides reasonable transparency and simplicity for customers.
The optimal monthly peak and off-peak tariff is proposed based on the competing
objectives of the customer and the LSE. Specifically, the objective considers the change in
customer payment, the LSE overall profit and load variation. A coefficient α is introduced
to represent dollar value of load change in (7.2) and more importantly to weight priority
of each objective. The output of this optimization is the deviation from fixed price in the
peak and off-peak period as well as new hourly load. Load change at each hour depends
on two variables: self-elasticity of demand, which represents change of demand at each
time because of price change at that same time, and cross-elasticity, which shows the
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∆dminbt ≤ ∆dbt ≤ ∆dmaxbt (5.2c)





















(d0btp0b − d0btLMPbt) (5.4)
In the above formulation, the superscript 0 indicates the flat rate condition where a
price is fixed for the whole month, whereas OPT and PT represent off-peak time and
peak time, respectively. Note we can write the deviations from nominal as:
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dbt = d0bt + ∆dbt (5.5)
pOPTb = p0b + ∆pOPTb (5.6)
pPTb = p0b + ∆pPTb (5.7)
The critical points for the TOU tariff design are both the load and LMP variation.
The main objective of the TOU DR program is to reduce load during peak times and
consequently the LMP variation should decrease. Note though that at some times during
the year the load variation between peak and off-peak may not be significant. In this case,
implementing an aggressive TOU could inadvertently result in a new peak and possibly
introduce greater price volatility. These times vary with region but mainly occur during
mild weather months, such as the spring months of March and April in the Western US.
5.2 TOU Program Results
As explained , a monthly peak and off-peak retail load tariff is considered for the TOU
scheme. Peak time is assumed from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. and off-peak from 10 p.m. to
10 a.m. A constant retail load tariff for the TOU program design corresponds to the
average monthly LMP in each region. Maximum load change at each hour considered is
5% with 1% that is reducible and the remaining 4% shiftable. Self-elasticity is set to be
-0.1 and cross-elasticity is 0.07. According to the output of the TOU optimization from
(7.2), the peak and off-peak tariff difference can be calculated. For current case study, α
is considered to be $1 per MWh to reflect relatively less emphasis. Results for the San
Francisco and PG&E region are shown in Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2, respectively. A constant
price is indicated by (*) whereas upper and lower lines provide the peak and off peak
tariffs in each month. The difference between peak and off peak is greater in summer
months reaching as much as $20 per MW.
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Figure 5.1: Peak and off peak tariff in San Francisco
In PG&E, there is no difference between the peak and off peak tariff in January, March
and April and little difference in February. As mentioned in sec. 5.1, TOU DR programs
are more suitable if there exists considerable difference between peak and off peak time
prices and loads. In most regions in the WECC model during these months, the LMP
curve has a low standard deviation and a small difference between day and night. As a
result, there is little benefit to implementing TOU in these months. The Northwest has
a different LMP curve pattern relative to other regions. The LMP has a small standard
deviation (less than 0.5) and the day and night average are close in most of the months.
For the Northwest, only in January does the cold weather make some sense for a TOU
rates. For other months, IBDR is more acceptable as a method to reduce peak prices.
Tab. 5.1 shows the LSEs benefit and customers saving after TOU DR program. LSEs
benefit after DR is approximately the same in all regions; however relative to the IBDR
program, this benefit is much less. Customers saving varies by each region but it is
comparable with LSE benefit reflecting a fairness to the tariff design. Also despite the
IBDR program, a TOU mandatory is for all customers so it brings saving for everyone as
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Figure 5.2: Peak and off peak tariff in PG&E region
long as they modify their consumption, accordingly. Fig. 5.3 shows the customers saving
and LSEs net revenue change exclusively through the TOU DR program. Again, relative
benefits are similar.
Table 5.1: LSEs benefit and customers saving after TOU program
Region LSEs benefit Customers saving
San Diego 16.07% 5.54%
Bay area 13.18% 7.79%

















Bay Area Cnt. coast PG&E Nevada SCE
LSE net revenue by TOU program Customer saving
Figure 5.3: Customers saving and LSEs net revenue by TOU program
5.3 Impact of DR Programs on LSE Benefit
IBDR and TOU ] as individual programs was discussed previously. Each has its own
advantages. In this section, we want to combine these program to see whether further
benefits can be realized. The IBDR program maximum threshold of load reduction is set
to 10% of total load. Retail prices are found for TOU program. To find the optimum
threshold for IBDR, the maximum hours that DR can be activated in each day is three.
Since the TOU program decreases the number of price spikes, the need for the incentive
program is also reduced. Results show the maximum percentage of time that DR activates
yearly is at most case 18% (1621 hours) in the SCE region, but on average just 8% of
the year (699 hours) requires IBDR. Thus by shifting less than 5% of the load and
reducing 10% of the total load for 8% time of year, a large costs savings and significant
impact on LMP is realized. The main reason is the region based design for DR programs.
The accumulation of small load modification across all regions results in significant price
changes.
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Table 5.2: LSEs net revenue change by each DR program
High benefit Net revenue Net revenue Total net revenue
region by TOU by IBDR by both DR
San Diego 16.07% 36.36% 58.27%
Cnt. Coast 10.73% 38.46% 53.32%
San Francisco 13.12% 34.83% 52.52%
PG&E 10.89% 35.40% 50.15%
Low benefit region
Idaho 10.21% 14.33% 26.00%
Rocky Mt. 11.87% 12.50% 25.85%
Northwest 1.08% 13.86% 15.09%
Both TOU and IBDR need to bring benefits for both the customers and LSEs to be
acceptable. Tab. 5.2 shows LSEs net revenue change for each program based on the opti-
mization procedure and then for the combined program in both low and high beneficial
regions. Base case in this table is the LSE total net revenue without any DR programs.
Notice TOU benefit tends to be uniform for most regions while IBDR varies more. This
is due to the nature of the original LMP spikes variation in each region. If the TOU
program can eliminate most of the higher values of LMP, then there may be little benefit
to the IBDR program.
LSEs net revenue per total load ($/MW) for base case, after TOU and after IBDR is
shown in Fig. 5.4. Base case in this figure means with no demand response program.Fig. 5.5
shows the LSEs total net revenue relation with average LMP during high price periods.
Regions with higher average LMP have higher revenue by DR programs. Thus, the North-
west that has the smallest price spikes and price variation has the least benefit of DR.
PG&E has highest residential load in WECC, so it has the highest LMP peak, especially
in summer, and consequently obtains the most benefit from DR programs.
5.4 Effect of DR Programs on Customer Savings
Customer savings after DR are shown in Tab. 5.3. The base case is the customer’s monthly
electricity payment without any DR, which is assumed to be the flat rate price based on
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Figure 5.4: LSEs net revenue per total load by different DR program
Table 5.3: Customers saving in each region
High benefit region Total reduction (%) Low benefit region Total reduction (%)
PG&E 9.56% San Diego 5.58%
SCE 8.47% Southwest 5.36%
Bay area 7.83% Fresno 5.26%
Nevada 7.83% SMUD 4.70%
the seasonal average of LMP in each region. This saving mainly arises from the TOU pro-
gram since incentive payments are only for customers who participate in DR programs.
Therefore, the customer saving for IBDR is less than 1% considering all customers. Cus-
tomer savings and LSEs net revenue per total load, after both DR programs are shown
in Fig. 5.6, sorted from high to low benefit. The revenue for LSEs and customer savings
remains comparable in all regions. Thus, the results here for the proposed DR program
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Average of high season LMP
Figure 5.5: Total LSEs net revenue in compare with average LMP
5.5 Effect of DR Programs on LMP
In Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 5.8, the monthly average LMP and standard deviation are shown
before and after the DR programs in San Diego and LADWP regions. LMP average and
volatility is relatively small in the winter and higher during the summer peak period as
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Figure 5.8: Monthly standard deviation of LMP in LADWP
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6 Generator Outage and Using IBDR to
Diminish Economic Impact
Transmission and distribution systems mainly face two broad types of reliability issues:
insufficient capacity (generation or transmission) and resilience to faults. Insufficient
capacity is a major threat for the system viability especially at the transmission level. In
this case, ISOs call on capacity of available resources and emergency units first and then
ask for DR for large customers [166]. Market operators using various types of emergency
load relief programs during shortages. New York ISO (NYISO) offers emergency DR and
distributed load relief programs for customers who can shed at least 100 kW and 50 kW,
respectively. PJM ISO (Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland) has two levels of load response
program during emergency, voluntary and mandatory program, which are implemented
based on the severity of situation. CAISO has mandatory interruptible DR program which
requires that customer shed at least 100 kW [167]. Most of these programs target large
customers. The potential of small customers in these circumstances is underestimated.
In this chapter, the effect of small customers on load reduction is investigated for outage
conditions.
6.1 Effect of Generator Outage on Market Price
During a shortage of capacity, such as, a generator outage, the market operator must ask
for more expensive generators to meet the demand. This can cause sharp and sudden
changes in market price. Since unscheduled generator outage is a real time problem,
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the unit commitment result would not be changed and economic dispatch should be done
using available reserve generators. After a generator outage, the LMP can be found using
















GSFki × Pit ≤ limitk (6.2b)
Gmini ≤ Git ≤ Gmaxi (6.2c)
Rminit × Rampdowni ≤ Rit ≤ Rmaxit × Ramp
up
i (6.2d)
Pit = Git −Djt (6.2e)
According to above formulation, after generator outage, market price found according
to available generators and selected reserves to dispatch. For reserve generators, ramp
rate of their output power and their start up cost should also be considered.
6.2 Using IBDR to Decrease Economic Consequence
Emergency DR in most of current literature is seen as that large enough to meet require-
ments of reserve market; however, aggregate of small customers could also be significant
enough to meet shortage capacity, but they are rarely mentioned in literature. In this
chapter, it will be shown that small customers, especially residential sector, could be















Before Outage After Outage After DR
Figure 6.1: LMP on bus# 215-July 6th -100% of DR potential
chapter as an economic based program, which tries to decrease economic consequence of
an element outage in the power system. This DR does not deal directly with reliability
but the related economic effects [193].
In Fig. 6.1 and Fig. 6.2, a coal unit is considered to be out for two hours on July 6th.
The generator outage is considered on peak time to simulate worst case situation in the
system. During peak hours, most of the available generators are producing maximum
output, and therefore, outage of one significantly effects market price. If the proposed
IBDR in this chapter could be useful during peak hours, it should be effective in other
hours with less price change as well.
As shown generator outage has considerable effect on LMP, but IBDR will significantly
diminish sharp change in LMP. In Fig. 6.1, 100% of the estimated potential of DR is
captured and in Fig. 6.2, only 70% of the estimated load change is achieved. Even with
70% of the forecast load reduction, DR has considerable impact on LMP. In other words,
Fig. 6.2 shows that even if there is 30% error in estimation of load change potential (that is
considerable), still IBDR effectively mitigates the economic impact of a generator outage.















Before Outage After Outage After DR
Figure 6.2: LMP on bus# 215-July 6th -70% of DR potential
the whole system and many regions would incur costs from a higher LMP; the DR only
needs to be implemented in the region with the outage. This point is significantly helpful
for practical implementation of DR program. When generator is out for unscheduled
reasons in one region, there is no need to communicate with other regions for load mod-
ification. Fig. 6.3 show the results of LSE benefit loss after the outage and after DR.
The generator outage results in significant costs increase, especially for the PG&E region
where the generator is located. The, IBDR effectively reduces costs for all LSEs.
In Tab. 6.1, the load reduction and incentive payment at 5 p.m. of July 6th are shown
for some of the load buses in the PG&E region. The load reduction is either small or
the incentive amount is significant in response to the load change. Customers get more
than $4 incentive in response to each MW change. This load change occurs rarely, i.e.,
only following an outage, so it is not a large impact on customer’s comfort. In Fig. 6.4,
another example of DR impact on prices is shown. In this case, a gas turbine is out for
two hours on October 14th. Summary of savings for LSEs after DR is shown in Fig. 6.5.
In this example, LADWP has highest benefit lost, since the gas turbine is located in this
region. As in the previous example, IBDR effectively reduces the economic consequences
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Figure 6.3: July 6th- LSEs benefit lost
of the generator outage.
6.3 Economic Rank of Generator Outage
A challenge for designing DR in outage condition is time constraints. Fast response is
important in shortage condition since it could endanger reliability of system. On the
one hand, small customers are one of the slowest responders for DR. To overcome this
contrast, the novel idea of outage economic ranking is proposed. Economic ranking is
ordering outage of each element based on their expected effect on market price. This
helps operators to estimate economic consequence of generator outage faster than the
market real time price window and allows time to implement appropriate DR.
The electrical distance approach is used to rank economic consequence of generator
outage. When there is an outage, power is shifted among generators to different trans-
mission paths. Distribution factors such as the power transfer distribution factor (PTDF)
and line outage distribution factor (LODF) are used to estimate changes in line power
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Table 6.1: Demand Response Report at 17 p.m. in PG&E region












flow and generator injection due to these faults. These factors, which are based on the
DC power flow method, provide approximate but a quick solution for the change in power
flows. Higher PTDF and LODF, means a larger change in system caused by the change
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Figure 6.4: LMP on bus# 11- October 14th
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Figure 6.5: October 14th - LSEs benefit lost





This requires the angle value of the “from” and “to” buses, which is obtained from (10.3b)
.
δ = B−1P (6.4)
where B is from the impedance matrix of system as follows:
B = Im(Y ) = ( −XL
R2L +X2L
) (6.5)
The inverse of B at the nth bus without loss of generality is taken as the slack bus, a
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zero entry is inserted for the nth row and column, so this new matrix is labeled as X.
Therefor the PTDF matrix is as follows:
PTDF = Bbr × A×XL (6.6)
where Bbr is a NT ×NT dimensional matrix and A is NT ×NL , the branch incidence matrix
where 1 and −1 stand for the “for bus” and “to bus” respectively.
There are three important sets of elements in power market, marginal units which
define market price at each time, expensive generators and congested lines which lead
to different prices in various locations. Electrical distance from each of these sets give
an appropriate measure for ordering economic consequence of each generator outage.
Economic ranking is helpful for any corrective actions since the operator can immediately
initiate appropriate DR without waiting for the next real time price market window to
see its true effect.
In the following example, we investigate how generators can be ranked based on their
economic impact. Three generators are chosen, which have similar power output but
with different effects on LMP. Their economic impact is ordered as generators 208, 199
and 227. It means, an outage of gas turbine number 208 has the highest impact on price
change and outage of generator 227 has the least effect. In the following tables, the
distribution factor for these generators on congested lines, marginal units and expensive
units is shown. These distribution factors act as a sensitivity where the higher values
reflect a tighter relation and closer electrical distance. In Tab. 6.2 and Tab. 6.3, there
is no clear pattern between the distribution factors that match with economic order of
the generators. Still in Tab. 6.4, generator 208 has highest factor to the all expensive
generators and unit 227 has the lowest factor. This trend matches with their economic
ordering.
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Table 6.2: Distribution factor of generators with congested lines
Congested line Gen. 208 Gen. 199 Gen. 227
123-138 0.2249 0.1955 0.0705
57-172 0.2403 0.2108 0.1806
58-146 0.2164 0.187 0.2027
63-179 0.262 0.2336 0.1613
64-54 0.1441 0.1147 0.1513
77-196 0.0538 0.0414 0.2523
107-215 0.2027 0.1733 0.1072
Table 6.3: Distribution factor of generators with marginal units
Marginal unit Gen. 208 Gen. 199 Gen. 227
209 0.2408 0.2113 0.277
139 0.1655 0.1361 0.1726
210 0.1319 0.0829 0.2473
126 0.2326 0.264 0.1917
140 0.1572 0.2075 0.2828
155 0.0826 0.06 0.2636
166 0.2216 0.1921 0.0793
178 0.2553 0.2413 0.169
197 0.2298 0.2004 0.0892
161 0.1053 0.0445 0.2502
Table 6.4: Distribution factor of generators to expensive units
Expensive Gen. Gen. 208 Gen. 199 Gen. 227
190 0.2762 0.1507 0.0898
180 0.1692 0.162 0.1326
174 0.2457 0.1364 0.0829
201 0.2281 0.1986 0.1644
157 0.3442 0.3147 0.2472
216 0.2102 0.1608 0.1355
202 0.2995 0.2701 0.2399
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7 Impact of Wind Forecast Error on Real
Time Market Price
The real time market price is associated with uncertainty due to load or RER forecast
error, unscheduled outage and so on. Various approaches to these forecasts are possible
but weather is one of the key components and requires multiple source of data. For
example, California ISO (CAISO) used neural network based forecasting software for its
Day-Ahead (DA) forecast. To ensure the average load forecast error is minimized, CAISO
continuously updates its DR forecast data based on updated weather information. CAISO
also uses the scheduled energy data that each LSE would submit in the DA market. Each
LSE has its own method of load forecasting for its offers in the market [170]. With the
current state-of-the-art in forecasting tools, load forecast error for DA is typically less
than 2%, which normally would not cause any major issues [169]. The main source of
uncertainty in DA scheduling for RERs is due to two main reasons. First, RER are
not required to submit bids in the DA market and moreover the forecast error for wind
generators in DA is around 30%. Currently, the uncertainty associated with forecasting
the output levels of intermittent resources in the DA time frame do not pose any reliability
concerns as the levels are not great; however with expansion of RERs, this could lead
to reliability issues as well as increased financial risk. In this chapter, a scenario based
economic dispatch is introduced, using the DOE approach for scenario reduction, to
simulate variation of real time market prices considering wind forecast error.
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Table 7.1: Summary of wind forecast error statistics
Average Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation Autocorrelation
Winter 0.00 -0.36 0.31 0.07 0.61
Spring 0.00 -0.43 0.31 0.09 0.71
Summer 0.00 -0.32 0.31 0.08 0.65
Fall 0.00 -0.32 0.4 0.08 0.59
7.1 Wind Forecast Error Distribution
The wind forecast error used in this study is based on information from the AWS
TrueWind corporation. It is calculated by taking the difference between the actual and
forecast production from June 2006 through May 2011 [170]. The forecast error for vari-
ous time frames are shown in Tab. 7.1. The autocorrelation (R) is calculated to determine
the time-dependence of forecast errors. If the R value is close to 1 it shows that there is
strong positive relation between current and previous values. When the R value is close
to -1, it expresses the negative dependency between the observations. An autocorrelation
close to 0 indicates that the current value provides no information about the next value.
In our study, the correlation between forecast errors of seven power plants is assumed to
be negligible due to their significant geographic distance.
R = 1(n− 1)σ2
n−1∑
i=1
(Xi − µ)(Xi+1 − µ) (7.1)
The statistical distribution of the forecast error was analyzed in [170]. The forecast er-
ror distribution mainly follows a truncated normal distribution. A truncated distribution
simply bounds the extreme points. This characteristic is more practical for physically
constrained data. For example, we can not expect the wind forecast error to exceed
plant capacity. The truncated normal distribution is represented in piece-wise function
to ensure no value falls outside the boundary. It is re-scaled by the normal distribution
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Figure 7.1: Tolerance intervals for normal distribution
as in Fig. 7.2.
PDFTND(ε) =

0, −∞ ≤ ε ≤ εmin
PDFN (ε)´ εmax
εmin
PDFN (ε)dε εmin ≤ ε ≤ εmax
0, εmax ≤ ε ≤ +∞
(7.2)









)2 , −∞ ≤ ε ≤ +∞ (7.3)
Maximum and minimum of forecast error shown in Tab. 7.1 are equivalent to more than
3 standard deviations, which means, if we use these ranges, we cover about 99.7% of the
data as shown in Fig. 7.1. A tolerance interval shows a statistical interval that a specific
proportion of sampled data would fall within with some confidence level. Distribution of
the wind forecast error in each season is shown in Fig. 7.2.
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Figure 7.2: Day ahead wind forecast error by season
7.2 Scenario Based Economic Dispatch
There are many methods to address the uncertainty of variables in optimization problems.
In this dissertation, a scenario based robust approach is chosen to estimate the effect
of wind forecast error on market price. The scenario method or scenario optimization
approach is a technique for finding the solutions to robust optimization and also chance-
constrained optimization problems that have some random constraints. The technique
has existed for decades as a heuristic approach and more recently a more systematic
foundation has been developed. The goal of this section is to simply find a range of
market prices due to wind forecast error. This range will be useful in our other analysis
for robust DR design. Here, the scenarios are simply input to an economic dispatch since
unit commitment results generally do not change if renewable output deviates from their
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Djts , ∀s ∈ S (7.5a)






GSFkjDjts ≤ Fmaxk , ∀s ∈ S (7.5c)
In (10.2f), the cost of wind power is not considered since wind units are “must take” in
the market. Index s in the above formulation refers to the different scenarios. Since the
purpose is to find a range of prices, equal probability is considered for all scenarios. Each
scenario in (10.2f) refers to a particular output of wind generation, considering various
level of forecast error. After running all scenarios, the minimum and maximum market
prices can be found. The main obstacle for this method is the size of scenario sets. Since
the main objective is to find a range of prices, one appropriate method to deal with
number of scenarios is the DOE approach as discussed in next section.
7.3 Price variation: DOE approach
The objective of this section is to find range of market prices using the minimum possible
number of scenarios.
7.3.1 Fractional Factorial
With 7 wind farms, the full factorial model has 27 = 128 combinations which is too large
for the analysis over a full year. An alternative is to use a fractional factorial design
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[171, 111]. In a full factorial design, we would build models with 7 variable interactions
as follows:




aijxixj + ...+ αx1x2...x7 (7.6)
Using a fractional factorial instead of full factorial can be justified if the reduced model
is efficient and the missing information is limited. Specifically:
• Efficiency of design: This criteria quantifies the goodness or efficiency of an exper-
imental design. Common measures of the efficiency of an (ND × p) design matrix
X are based on the information matrix X ′X . There are three major efficiency
measures [172]:
– A-efficiency is a function of the arithmetic mean of the eigenvalues (and the
arithmetic average of the variances) is given by the trace ((X0X)−1)/p
A− efficiency = 100 1
NDtrace((X0X)−1)/p
(7.7)
– D-efficiency is a function of the geometric average of the eigenvalues and it
is given by |(X0X)−1|1/p. Both D-efficiency and A-efficiency are based on the
concept of average variance but using a different mean.
D − efficiency = 100 1
ND|(X0X)−1|1/p
(7.8)
– G-efficiency is based on σM which is the maximum standard error of prediction
over the candidate set.






Table 7.2: Design Efficiency




There are no absolute values of the above inefficiencies that are given in the
literature and could be used to measure the effectively of study approach and
the observations. Instead, the efficiency values of different designs should be
compared to each other to make an appropriate decision.
The proposed model is a fractional factorial model with 27−3 treatment combinations.
As give in Tab. 7.3, instead of 128 treatment combinations we now have 27−3 = 16 com-
binations. The first criteria for validity of fractional factorial model is efficiency. As seen
in Tab. 7.2, switching from full factorial to fractional factorial is valid. The second crite-
ria requires finding confounding pattern. The following formula shows the confounding
pattern of fractional factorial model. As it can be seen, there is no ambiguity about
definition of any main effect.
I = x2x3x4x5 = x1x3x4x6 = x1x2x5x6 = x1x2x4x7 = x1x3x5x7 = x2x3x6x7 = x4x5x6x7
(7.10)
7.3.2 Results
Since the model has all factors at both low level and high levels as well as all two and
three factor interactions, it is highly likely that we will capture the range of variation in
LMP. Another possibility is anomaly in the data with the maximum/minimum somewhere
between +1s and -1s. A point (0000000) is added to model to capture that situation. If
surface analysis shows any significant, then a follow up design and analysis is necessary
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Table 7.3: Treatment Combinations
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7
T1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 T9 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1
T2 -1 -1 -1 +1 +1 +1 +1 T10 +1 -1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1
T3 -1 -1 +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 T11 +1 -1 +1 -1 +1 -1 +1
T4 -1 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 T12 +1 -1 +1 +1 -1 +1 -1
T5 -1 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 +1 T13 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 +1 -1
T6 -1 +1 -1 +1 -1 +1 -1 T14 +1 +1 -1 +1 -1 -1 +1
T7 -1 +1 +1 -1 -1 +1 +1 T15 +1 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1
T8 -1 +1 +1 +1 1 -1 -1 T16 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1
Figure 7.3: Parameter estimates at hour 234 for bus 14
with points halfway inside the original design. Here the analysis shows that the given
design is valid. For one example, analysis at hour 234 for bus 14 is shown in Fig. 7.3 and
Fig. 7.4. Variable selection shows that LMP is dependent on the output of generator x3.
The prediction profile shows how the output of different generators will change the LMP
on bus 14. The parameter x3 has the highest slope and is the most effective predictor.
As another example, consider bus 8. The original LMP is categorized into $5 intervals
and the change in LMP is analyzed for each interval. In addition to surface analysis, the
surface profile can confirm the small curvature assumption. For different price segments,
the prediction profile is depicted in Fig. 7.5. Prediction profile shows how changes of
each factor changes the model output. For example with the price of $35, the slope of
x3 is greatest and is the most predictive. The interaction profile is depicted in Fig. 7.6.
The variable interactions do not show any curvature and generally change linearly. The
surface profile for different LMP prices is given in Fig. 7.7.
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Figure 7.4: Prediction profile at hour 234 for bus 14
7.4 Market Price Range Results
Using the scenario based economic dispatch and DOE approach, the uncertainty range
of price is now calculated. Selected examples during peak hours of different seasons
are presented in the following graphs. Generally, a lower LMP has a smaller range of
uncertainty since price is less sensitive to load or generation changes. If load is low
and RER output is sufficient, then forecast error should not cause much variation in
market price. While if demand is high and RER output is low, the forecast error could
have significant effect on price. In other words, the range of price uncertainty depends
primarily on load consumption and available RER production.
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Figure 7.5: Prediction profiler for bus 8
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Figure 7.6: Interaction profile for bus 8
Figure 7.7: Surface profile for bus 8
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Figure 7.8: Range of prices at daily peak hour in July in San Francisco
Figure 7.9: Range of prices at daily peak hour in March for SMUD
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Figure 7.10: Range of prices at daily peak hour in November for Idaho
Figure 7.11: Range of prices at daily peak hour in May for Rocky Mt.
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8 IBDR with High Penetration of RER
Global concerns of climate change and energy price have led to focused attention RERs.
Among the RERs, wind power generation remains the dominant source. The uncertain
nature of wind power and the relatively high investment costs create barriers to large scale
grid adoption. Nevertheless, it is expected that 20% of the total consumption in U. S. will
from wind power generation by 2030. The main research question is how best ISOs can
overcome the negative impacts of wind power intermittency and facilitate grid integration.
As of today, most power systems are operated under a “must take wind power” policy.
The approach so far has been to manage the wind volatility and uncertainty through
supply-side reserves. In this chapter, we show how the flexibility of the demand in terms
of consumption modification could effectively mitigate the intermittency. An robust
IBDR program considering real time market price forecast uncertainty is designed. In
addition, customer behavior uncertainty is simulated in terms of an elasticity range [113].
8.1 Impact of RER Expansion on LSE benefit
The customer tariff prices are chosen as close to the monthly average of LMP based on the
LSEs revenue objective function as in (4.1). Still, the LSE profit depends on the variation
in market price. As LMP variation is related to time of year and RER output, the LSE
benefit will also vary across regions and season. The impact of renewable expansion on
profit is assessed based on both the average and standard deviation of the LMP. Two
sets of examples are chosen: (1) PG&E and SMUD where LSE profit decreases after
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Figure 8.1: LSE benefit change in PG&E
expansion in all seasons, except summer; (2) Southwest, San Diego and LADWP where
LSE profit is reduced in winter and fall but increases in summer and spring. Within
the first set (Fig. 8.1), the monthly average of LMP and standard deviation increases
for all months. Since the load in off peak is much lower than at peak, the LSEs lose
profit relative to less price volatility. In summer, since standard deviation was high even
before renewable expansion of renewable, the revenue change is minimal. Among the
second group (Fig. 8.2), the change in average LMP is small and customer tariff remains
relatively unchanged. As a result, LSEs lose profit in the summer and spring and increase
profit in fall and winter.
In addition to above examples, there are three other regions where the impact of RERs
on LSE profit is interesting to discuss. The Northwest loses throughout the year. The
standard deviation of LMP in this region before expansion was small and so the price
volatility increases greatly. This is an interesting example of how variation in market
price can affect utility profit event if average costs remains approximately the same. In
the Rocky Mt. and Idaho regions, the LSE profit increases throughout the year. These
regions are closest to the location of large RERs and also have low load most of the year.
Therefore, the average LMP decreases after expansion most of the year.
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Figure 8.2: LSE benefit change in Southwest
8.2 Robust IBDR Optimization
In robust optimization, random variables are modeled as uncertain parameters that be-
long to a convex uncertainty set and primarily protect against worst case scenarios. In
robust optimization, the uncertain quantities, either parameters or random variables, are
modeled as parameters that belong to predefined intervals. One important concept in
robust optimization is the level of conservativeness.
8.2.1 Ellipsoid Uncertainty
Ellipsoidal uncertainty sets are used in this study but they will increase the problem
complexity. For example, the robust representative of a linear program is a second-order
cone problem. Ellipsoidal uncertainty sets are deemed an appropriate choice here based
on the Ben-Tal study [163]. Namely:
• A simple geometry of uncertainty is not mathematically interesting and provides
little insight.
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• An ellipsoid is a convenient entity as in can be represented in a simple parametric
format and is well-behaved numerically.
• In many cases of stochastic uncertain data, probabilistic arguments allow one to
replace stochastic uncertainty by an ellipsoidal deterministic uncertainty. For ex-
ample, an uncertain Linear Programming (LP) problem with random entries in
the constraint matrix. For a given x, the left hand side li(x) = aTi x + bi of the
ith constraint in the system, ATx + b0 ≥ 0, is a random variable with expectation
ei(x) = (a∗i )Tx + bi, and standard deviation vi(x) =
√
xTVix . A typical value
of the random variable li(x) will therefore be ei(x) ± O(vi(x)). For a light tail
distribution of the random data, a likely lower bound on this random variable is
l̂i(x) = ei(x) − θvi(x) with “safety parameter” θ of order of one (cf. the engineers
“3-rule” for Gaussian random variables). This bound leads to the “likely reliable”
version:
ei(x)− θvi(x) ≥ 0 (8.1)
Note that the latter constraint is exactly the robust counterpart of the original
uncertain constraint.
aTi x+ bi ≥ 0 ∀ai ∈ ui (8.2)
ui is specified as the ellipsoid set as follows:
ui = {a : (a− a∗i )TV −1i (a− a∗i ) ≤ θ} (8.3)
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8.2.2 Robust format of IBDR
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In matrix representation, (8.12) is:
−P 0GeTP inc + Z +GLMP TP inc − P incT diag(G)P inc ≥ DTLMP (8.14)
And by adding uncertainty range of variable to (8.14), we have:
− P 0(G0 + u1G1)eTP inc + Z + (G0 + u1G1)(LMP 0 + LMP 1)TP inc
− P incT diag((G0 + u1G1))P inc ≥ DT (LMP 0 + LMP 1) (8.15)
∀(u : ‖u‖2 ≤ 1) (8.16)
If there is a point in the ellipsoid ‖u‖2 ≤ τ that cannot satisfy the constraint (8.15),
the entire problem becomes infeasible. This possibility highly depends on the range of
variation, which we can manipulate to gain insight into the problem. We first define
conservativeness. In a linear problem, ρ ≥ 1 is level of conservativeness u = {(A0, b0) +
ρ(A1, b1)}. As ρ increases above 1, the feasible region shrinks and eventually fells inside
the original feasible region. The smallest ρ for which this occurs is called the level of
conservativeness. So we can increase the viable range by selecting a narrow range and
increasing ρ. Conversely, we can start with a large range and decrease ρ to find the largest
feasible set.
− P 0(G0 + u1G1)eTP inc + Z + (G0 + u1G1)(LMP 0 + LMP 1)TP inc−
P inc
T
diag((G0 + u1G1))P inc −DT (LMP 0 + LMP 1) ≥ 0 (8.17)
∀((u, τ) : ‖u‖2 ≤ τ) (8.18)
100
We want to make sure that if ‖u‖2 ≤ τ then constraint (8.17) holds. If we replace the
left hand side by w then we can write:
τ − uTu ≥ 0⇒ w ≥ 0 if ∃λ ≥ 0 : w ≥ λ(τ − uTu)




‖u‖2 ≤ τ (8.20)
− P 0(G0 + u1G1)eTP inc + Z + (G0 + u1G1)(LMP 0 + LMP 1)TP inc−
P inc
T
diag((G0 + u1G1))P inc −DT (LMP 0 + LMP 1)T ≥ λ(τ − uTu) (8.21)
λ ≥ 0 (8.22)
We use the τ as in the original model.
8.3 Robust IBDR Results
In this section, a deterministic and robust IBDR program are analyzed from different
perspectives. The price uncertainty is obtained from chapter 7 with elasticity range
is considered to be [−0.05 − 0.15] for small commercial and industrial customers and
[−0.1 − 0.2] for the residential sector. An important component in this work is identifying
risks that robust design can minimize.
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Figure 8.3: Hourly incentive payment vs. expected LMP in San Diego during July
8.3.1 Comparison of Deterministic and Robust Program
From the LSE point of view, an IBDR program faces risks due either unexpectedly high
LMP or unexpectedly low LMP. For high LMP, LSEs should pay greater incentive and
increase the demand response. In a deterministic solution, this situation leads under-
payment for DR. For low LMP, the deterministic program results in over-payment of
incentives.
As shown in chapter 3 for most times, the expected day-ahead LMP falls approxi-
mately midway between the lowest and highest possible LMP. In thess hours, robust and
deterministic programs have similar results. This does not always though. In Fig. 8.3, an
hourly incentive payment for deterministic and robust program vs. market price range
are shown for peak hours in one week of July. When the expected LMP falls close to ei-
ther the maximum on minimum LMP, then there is robust solution provides significantly
different incentive payments. In Fig. 8.4, results are plotted in the Southwest region for
one week in October. When risk of higher LMP is greater, e.g. hours 5, 6 and 7, ro-
bust pay greater incentive to the customers to take advantage of an “opportunity” in the
market. For a lower price risk, e.g., hours 1, 2 and 3, robust pays less incentive to avoid
unnecessary losses from over-payments.
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Figure 8.4: Hourly incentive payment vs. expected LMP in Southwest during October
If real time LMP deviates little the forecast value, then obviously the robust IBDR
program has little benefit. Still, significant errors during only a few hours results in
significant loss without the robust approach. Tab. 8.1 show LSE benefit under the two
IBDR programs for expected case, low LMP and higher LMP cases. Note that profit loss
the expected values covers an entire month but unexpected LMP reflects only an hour.
Thus, the robust solution can cover lost profit with with just a few hours of unexpectedly
high or low prices.
Another important comparison between robust and deterministic program is the effect
on market price. Higher incentive payments will lead to greater DR. Therefore, con-
sidering low LMP concern, the robust solution pays less incentive, while for high LMP
concern, the robust pays more incentive. Thus, the net effect should be less volatility in
LMP. Fig. 8.5 shows LMP variation in one day at July for Bay area region. In hour 10,
the robust solution lowers LMP but increases LMP during.
8.3.2 Effect of IBDR on LSE profit
Whether RER expansion results in profit loss or gain for LSEs, IBDR is an effective
tool to reduce market peak prices and bring other benefits to all participants. IBDR
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Table 8.1: Comparison of LSE profit by DR (different between robust and deterministic)
July
Region Expected Low LMP High LMP
Southwest -$109,953 $55,277 $32,276
San Diego -$10,022 $16,902 $6,362
LADWP -$17,883 $7,307 $7,560
Bay area -$20,152 $6,684 $2,939
Fresno -$9,283 $3,480 $2,511
Rocky Mt. -$43,855 $18,416 $16,077
Idaho -$13,147 $5,130 $4,559
Nevada -$9,387 $5,753 $6,038
SMUD -$27,720 $8,722 $11,583
Feb.
Region Expected Low LMP High LMP
Southwest -$160,336 $51,141 $47,221
San Diego -$18,327 $4,410 $2,519
San Francisco -$29,168 $2,134 $1,924
Bay area -$193,073 $23,863 $20,679
Cnt. Coast -$67,225 $7,434 $5,246
PG&E -$267,146 $60,296 $80,058
rocky Mt. -$209,917 $15,818 $14,758
Idaho -$58,673 $11,492 $10,754
SCE -$196,412 $19,161 $12,026
program design in this thesis is region based, so each region implements a DR program
individually. Considering the total demand response, the LMP changes are considerable
even with relatively small load changes in each region. Fig. 8.6 shows two examples of
LSE profit change after RERs expansion and DR. In (a), several regions are shown that
lose profit under RER expansion but DR decreases the percentage loss. In (b), several
regions are shown that increase profit and under DR profit increases more. Fig. 8.7 shows
the effect of DR on net revenue in regions where expansion has an overall negative impact
on profit (part a) and an overall positive impact on profit (part b). In both cases, DR
remains effective and helps compensate for economic consequence of high RERs.
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Figure 8.5: Effect of robust and deterministic program on LMP in Bay area during June
8.3.3 Customer savings under IBDR
Fig. 8.8 shows customer saving per load change during summer and winter. As expected,
summer has the greatest benefits for customers, since the load change in the peak season
is more critical. The incentive payments shown in Fig. 8.8 indicate the proposed IBDR
achieves acceptable saving for customers. The proposed IBDR in this thesis would be
a voluntary program and would not change customers monthly tariff, but simply pay
sufficient incentives to reward participants. That is, savings are only for customers who
participate.
8.3.4 Effect of IBDR on LMP
In addition to benefits for load aggregators and customers, the proposed IBDR program
will impact price, especially at peak times. In Fig. 8.9, Fig. 8.10 and Fig. 8.11, the LMP
variation for the worss day of August, February and October is shown, respectively. The
largest effect on LMP occurs during the summer higher sensitivity to load change at
peak times and greater incentive payments from each LSE (Fig. 8.8). The effect of RER
expansion on LMP variation can be seen in Fig. 8.11. While the LMP profile no longer
simply follows load variation but follows RER generation profile. Still, DR reduces LMP
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a) Profit loss (summer)
b) Profit gain (winter)








Figure 8.8: Customer saving under each IBDR program
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Figure 8.9: LMP variation in one day of August in Fresno
volatility.
8.4 Discussion on TOU Effectiveness
Implementation of an effective TOU program after RER expansion is challenging as the
variation of LMP does not follow a regular pattern that customers could anticipate. Note
the following situations:
• Low load and high RER production. The variation of price in one day will not
match the typical specific peak and off peak hours, because LMP variation mostly
follows the RER output instead of load profile. An example is show in Fig. 8.12 for
Idaho during first four days of October.
• High load and low RER production. iWe can find peak and off peak period for each
day individually but they will still vary across days. Even though RER output
is low, the RERs still have the highest influence on LMP value. The peak prices
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Figure 8.10: LMP variation in one day of Feb. in PG&E
occur during the lowest RER production. An example is shown in Tab. 8.2 for the
San Diego area in March. The table compares day two and three as an example
to variation in peak hours. To design an effective TOU program, the peak and off
peak time period must be changed each day.
• Moderate load and moderate RER production. Peak and off peak time periods are
relatively similar each day; however, the LMP value varies greatly. The TOU can
be designed based on constant peak and off peak period with a varying tariff from
day to day. An example is shown in Fig. 8.13 for Rocky Mt. during one week of
January.
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Figure 8.11: LMP variation in one day of October in Nevada
Figure 8.12: LMP variation during 4 days of October in Idaho
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Table 8.2: Peak and off peak periods from March 8th to 14th in San Diego
Off peak hours
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7
1 1 1 1 1 2 1
2 2 14 2 2 4 2
3 4 15 3 3 5 3
4 3 16 4 4 14 4
5 5 17 5 5 15 5
6 6 18 6 6 16 6
19 7 19 7 7 17 7
20 8 20 8 19 18 8
Peak hours
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7
7 12 2 13 8 1 12
8 13 3 14 9 3 13
9 14 5 15 10 6 14
10 15 4 16 11 7 15
11 16 6 17 12 8 16
12 17 7 18 13 9 17
13 18 8 19 14 10 18
14 19 9 20 15 11 19
Figure 8.13: LMP variation in one week of January in Rocky Mt.
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9 Estimation of IB Elasticity for Residential
Customers
A key factor in the design of almost all demand response programs is the load elasticity.
Elasticity is a measure of the customer response to a tariff or incentive. Due to the com-
plexity of human behavior and corresponding electricity use, demand elasticity remains
poorly understood. Many studies have been conducted over the years to estimate elastic-
ity of electricity demand to price signals, particularly, during the 1980s and early 1990s
when energy prices were rising rapidly and concerns about energy conservation increased
[173]. The majority of these studies use an electricity demand modeling technique to
calculate price and income elasticity of electricity; however, they almost exclusively focus
on on PB elasticity. There is a need for further research on IB elasticity. This chapter
explores this subject.
9.1 Problem Statement
The distinction between customer response to a price or incentive signal is the main
motivation for this study. IBDR as a reward program should compare favorably to
PBDR programs as customers tend to see PB approaches as a punishment. There are
three components of elasticity explored in this chapter:
• elasticity of residential customers,
• elasticity toward an IBDR program, and
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• elasticity specific to different household appliances.
9.1.1 Residential customer
The residential sector makes up about 40% of total electric energy consumption. At peak
time, the share is higher and it can be as much as 50% of consumption. In addition,
according to U.S. energy information administration, residential sector load is growing
and demand is expected to increase at least 15% by 2040 [167]. Historically, industrial
and large commercial loads are considered to be best candidates for DR programs due to
the challenge of controlling large numbers of small residential loads. Still, residential loads
can provide more reliable response in compare with small number of large loads [174].
Local controls in the residential sector can allow for faster response [175, 176]. Finally,
smaller loads can effectively provide continuous response unlike larger loads [177]. Today,
DR potential of residential sector remains untapped.
9.1.2 IBDR programs
IBDR is a reward system in contrast with PBDR programs that can be seen as a punish-
ment (paying a penalty) program. Studies show that people subject to punishment type
programs are more nervous, less happy and are less responsive [178]. People are more
likely to accept incentive contract described in bonus terms than contracts that appear
exactly the same except for being explained in penalty terms [179]. In addition, cus-
tomer’s preference for reward based programs increase with experience that makes IBDR
programs more effective over the long term [180]. Other concerns about PBDR programs
include the need for extensive infrastructure to implement on a large scale, social equity
and price volatility [181, 182]. Generally, retail customers are risk-averse and not willing
to make decisions about consumption on hourly basis as is required for PBDR programs,
such as, TOU [183]. Precise evaluation of the IBDR program on other hand is highly
related to elasticity.
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9.1.3 Household appliance usage
Elasticity at household appliance level is similar to the concept of distributed control of
different appliance in residential demand management programs [184, 185]. Residential
load can be classified into two categories: controllable and critical. Critical loads that are
very important in a customer’s life with interruptions highly inconvenient or dangerous.
Controllable loads are those that can be shifted in time without as great an impact on
consumers lifestyle [186]. Space cooling and heating, water heating, lighting and washing
device are generally considered controllable. HVAC has the main potential as a DR
resource because of the relatively large power consumption. Overall, about 25% of total
electric energy consumption belongs to air conditioners, ventilation and heating [167]. In
addition, they are easily defer able since buildings have thermal inertia. Washing devices
do not have much power consumption, but can be easily rescheduled without significant
effect on comfort. Assessing elasticity at the appliance level can lead to more accurate
estimation of the effectiveness of DR programs.
9.2 Methodology
Elasticity is generally the proportion of relative change in demand for a product that
is caused by a change in the price of the product. Generally, the demand for most
products decreases as the price of the commodity increases. This is true for electricity
as well, therefore elasticity of electricity has a negative sign. In addition since electricity
is so critical in today’s life, price change would hardly effect consumption of customer.
Therefore, elasticity of electricity is small and less than unity most of the times. Elasticity





































Approach for calculation of elasticity in (10.1) accordingly requires estimation of the load
change and incentives.
9.2.1.1 Financial incentive calculation
There are different ways to estimate customer’s financial incentives expectation. Process
of estimation is both complicate and divers. Perhaps one of the best way is directly
asking customers. This means a survey should design for each target customers to get
information about their desired incentives. However, there is tight relation between
incentive amount and load change that makes this step complex. Customers should
know how much they should change their consumption to fill out their desired incentives,
and in other hand, utility should know how much response they would be received to
estimate their affordable incentives. To overcome this complexity, there is two ways. One
is that utilities should ask several questions to cover different possibilities. This method,
although would give more comprehensive vision of customers, but it makes survey too
long and tedious. Alternative way is to ask about optimum situation that is acceptable
for both customers and utility. In this chapter, second method is chosen.
9.2.1.2 Load change calculation
Another step of elasticity estimation is calculation of load change in response to financial
incentives as illustrates briefly in Fig. 9.1. Since elasticity in this chapter is based on
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Figure 9.1: Methodology Diagram
appliance, so load change for each one should calculate separately. There is two ways
to determine hourly power of each appliance, bottom up model and load disaggregation.
In bottom up model, each individual house energy would calculate based on some basic
information, like their life style, number of residence, area of house, outdoor temperature,
parameter of their electric device and etc. In this method, power consumption of each
appliance and load change could be both calculate with one tool. In case of lack of
information, load disaggregation method could be useful. This method uses historical
data to separate each device energy signal from aggregated one.
Controllable appliances divide into two groups, appliance with thermal setting and
other devices with ON/OFF switch. For thermal appliance like HVAC, water heating
and refrigerator, it’s against customer’s comfort to completely shut them down. One
way to save energy of these devices is to change their thermostat setting temporarily.
Therefore problem for these devices is converting the thermostat change to MW change
during the DR hour and calculation of returning load after DR hours. For this type of
device it is necessary to have access to appropriate toolbox to simulate their power in
order to convert temperature changing to MW.
For other appliance that could stop their consumption, like lighting, or shift them to off
peak hour like washing device, no conversion to MW is needed. Either load disaggregation
method or load simulation tools could be helpful [191].
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9.2.2 Data Estimation
In this subsection more details would be given on procedure of elasticity estimation by
explaining following tools: survey for incentive expectation evaluation, and Matlab based
toolbox for residential load modeling.
9.2.2.1 Survey Platform and Participants
The two survey studies were conducted through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
MTurk is a crowd sourcing internet market place which enables researchers and companies
to collect data on human intelligence tasks rapidly and inexpensively. Mturk has been
received great popularity among social scientists as a useful research tool to collect data .
To ensure the relevance and representatives of the data, only people who live in the U.S.
were asked to take the surveys. Surveys ran on two different season, winter and summer
respectively, to test customer’s reaction at different outdoor condition.
For the first survey, valid responses were collected from 665 U.S. residents. Among
the 711 respondents, 54.7% were females. Ages ranged from 18 to 75 (Medium = 30).
The majority of participants were White (81.80%), followed by Asian (5.11%), Black
(4.51%), and Hispanic (3.91%). Nearly half of the participants had at least a bachelor’s
degree or equivalent (47.14%). 60.16% participants had an annual household income
higher than $35,000, including a 21.63% having an annual household income higher than
$75,000. 35.49% identified themselves as democrats, while 15.04% identified themselves
as republicans.
For the second survey, 754 valid responses were collected, and the demographic char-
acteristics were similar: 58.2% were females. Ages ranged from 18 to 72 (Medium = 32).
The majority of participants were White (83.82%), followed by Black (4.91%), Hispanic
(4.38%), and Asian (3.58%). A little over half of the participants had at least a bache-
lor’s degree or equivalent (52.24%). 67.02% participants had an annual household income
higher than $35,000, including a 27.10% having an annual household income higher than
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$75,000. 40.05% identified themselves as democrats, while 28.25% identified themselves
as republicans.
The two surveys were composed of similar parts as follow: first, respondents answered
the type of heating and cooling devices that they use, source of energy, whether someone
stays at home between 9 am and 5 pm, and the usual thermostat setting during the
summer and winter. Second, respondents were proposed with a series of DR behaviors,
and asked to choose the minimum amount of money (scaled as a percentage of average
monthly bill) they would accept in exchange for adopting those behaviors. The major
behaviors included:
1) Raising/lowering HVAC thermostat setting for 2-3F 0 during summer/winter when
someone is at home.
2) Raising/lowering HVAC thermostat setting for 5F 0 or more during summer/winter
before everyone will be away for more than 4 hours.
3) Letting utility companies adjust HVAC thermostat setting for 2-3F 0 during sum-
mer/winter when someone is at home and the system load is high.
4) Shutting down HVAC devices for 10 minutes or 30 minutes as soon as receiving an
emergency message from the utility company.
Fig. 9.2 shows the answers of survey 1 participants to second part of questions. As it
shows, majority of customers need at least 10% incentives to modify their consumption.
Another interesting point is that, number of people who don’t change their load at all,
would significantly increase if utility wants to automatically adjust thermostat setting.
It shows people are concerned about their freedom and privacy. This could support
this claim that people are better responding to volunteer program than automation DR
programs.
Also, it is worth to point out, that during emergency situation, acceptable number of
people are willing to change their load without any incentives. They only need appropriate
message to informed them.
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Figure 9.2: Participant response to different incentive value questions
Third, respondents were asked to rate their electricity saving habits, such as “turn-
ing off lights when not in use” and “raising/lowering the cooling/heating temperature
when sleeping or away from home” on a Likert scale from 1 (“never”) to 7 (“always”).
At the end, social-psychological variables (such as concern for environmental impacts,
bill/money consciousness, need for comfort, and trust in utility companies) were mea-
sured and demographic information was collected.
We could divide survey participants based on their response to incentive expectation
to three groups. Low contribution groups which asks for more than 20% incentives, high
contribution which request less than 10% and medium contribution group. Although
there is not any dominant demographic characteristic between these groups, but still
some statistical pattern are interesting in these groups. Fig. 9.3 and Tab. 9.1 show some
statistical difference between low and high contribution groups.
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Figure 9.3: Education and rent/own distribution within different groups
Table 9.1: Demographic distribution in low and high contribution groups
characteristic High cooperative Low cooperative
Age More younger Less younger
Rent / own More rental Less rental
Education Higher education Even distribution
House occupant Less occupant More crowded
Income Less income Higher income
Male / female Even distribution More female
House area Average house Larger house
9.2.2.2 Residential load simulation
B. Johnson [187] develops Matlab based dynamic model for residential appliance including
home’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, water heater, refriger-
ator, freezer, washer, dryer, dishwasher, lighting, cooking, television and computer. The
dynamic model development is based on three items. First, occupant behavior and res-
idential activity pattern for an appliance are developed using data from the American
Time Use Survey (ATUS) [188]. Second, dynamic models for each appliance are built
using available literature. Third, these models are combined to produce a model of resi-
dential power demand. This model is based on statistics of contribution of each appliance
in residential load consumption, typical power rating of each of them and demographics
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of the overall population.
For model validation, multiple resources is used. The Oak ridge National Laboratory
rotating shadow band radiometers is used for recording local environmental data [189].
Residential load power consumption data is collected from ten control house in TVA’s
Campbell Creek energy efficient homes project and occupied home in Atlanta, GA is used
to validate individuals load models [190].
Residential appliance divide to four groups in this model, thermostatically controllable
load, deferrable load, uninterruptible load and additional load power. Details on modeling
of each appliance is given in reference [187, 188]. Using the information that is given in
two surveys, this toolbox is used to estimate power consumption of people who participate
before and after load change in Feb. and July of 2013.
9.3 Elasticity per appliance
For elasticity estimation of each device two values should calculate, load change and
incentive expectation. In Tab. 9.2 these values are listed for main appliances at home,
HVAC, lighting and washing device. Incentive amounts are derived from survey 1 and load
change is calculated using toolbox that is introduced in sec. 9.2.2.2. Load modification is
implemented for peak hour from 17:00 to 22:00.
Since in (10.1) both numerator and denominator must be in percentage, incentive
expectation is divided by monthly bill of survey participants.
In both months, highest elasticity belongs to lighting. It seems that energy saving from
lighting is relatively easy for most people to accept and they expect minimal incentives
to turn off extra lights. Elasticity among the various washing device appears relatively
and independent of season. HVAC depends highly on season as might be expected given
the variable needs of the year and different tolerance of hot and cold temperature.
Another point that could be discussed in Tab. 9.2 is load change of each appliance in
compare with total load change. This point could be more explained by Tab. 9.3 that
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Table 9.2: Survey1- elasticity report
Survey 1 July (%)
Appliance Appliance change Total change Incentive Elasticity
HVAC 4.77 2.71 13.01 0.21
Lighting 38.75 1.55 3.43 0.45
Dishwasher 35.57 0.65 5.46 0.12
Washer 28.32 0.11 6.05 0.23Dryer 28.52 1.27
Survey 1 Feb. (%)
HVAC 2.15 1.2 10.96 0.11
Lighting 28.27 1.41 3.37 0.42
Dishwasher 41.81 0.71 5.24 0.13
Washer 30.95 0.13 5.88 0.27Dryer 31.2 1.47
Table 9.3: Share of each device in aggregate signal
July Daily ratio (%) Peak ratio(%)
Appliance Average Min Max Average Min Max
HVAC 55.54 40.1 67.5 53.2 30.7 66.9
Lighting 4.7 3.4 6.9 6.2 4.1 12.4
Dishwasher 1.6 0.9 2.3 3.1 1.7 5.5
Washer 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.7
Dryer 4.6 3.1 7.1 5.4 3.3 8.9
Feb.
HVAC 52.2 35.6 74.4 37.6 22.9 70.8
Lighting 5.8 3.1 7.8 10.8 5.5 14.2
Dishwasher 1.6 0.8 2.4 3.8 1.3 5.4
Washer 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.7
Dryer 4.6 2.1 6.4 6.1 2.4 8.2
shows share of each appliance in aggregated load signal. In this table, average, maximum
and minimum contribution of each appliance power signal in monthly energy signal is
shown.
In Tab. 9.3, HVAC has highest contribution in total load signal by consuming on average
half of total load. For washing device, although customers contribution for load shift
program is acceptable and about 30% are willing to delay their washing program from
peak time to off peak, but since their power consumption is low, total load change is
small for this appliance and therefore elasticity is not significant number.
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Figure 9.4: Load signal of survey2 participants- July 2013
In Fig. 9.4 aggregated load signal is shown after HVAC and washing device load change
for hottest day in July 2013 considering survey 2 participants. Thermostat modification
has significant effect on load signal at peak hour. However, effect of washing device load
change is hardly noticeable on load profile. For washing device load is deferred form
peak time to off peak, so in Fig. 9.4 it’s shown at early morning that modified load curve
is higher than original one. In addition for HVAC device, thermostat setting change
should return to its original point for customer comfort after peak time, therefore load
consumption after 22:00 is considerably higher than original load level. To avoid new
peak load after 22:00, returning to original thermostat setting should be distribute in
time. In this chapter, DR end signal is administered in two hours.
9.4 Elasticity for HVAC Device
Generally speaking, highest portion of residential electricity consumption belongs to air
conditioner device (depending on the region), therefore its worth to study it in more
details. Elasticity is load change divided by incentive asking; so customers could be
124
Table 9.4: Survey2- HVAC elasticity report
July Total saving Incentive Average Energy (MWh/m) Elasticity
≤64 1.36 9.05 1.261 0.151
65 -68 2.41 10.30 1.058 0.234
68 -70 2.7 11.12 0.904 0.242
70-72 2.92 10.85 0.791 0.269
72 -74 3.06 10.14 0.682 0.3013
74 - 76 3.16 12.88 0.575 0.246
76 - 78 3.22 10.44 0.479 0.308
78- 80 3.08 11.81 0.381 0.261
≥80 3 10.79 0.3 0.2782
Feb.
≤64 0.64 9.39 1.196 0.069
65 -68 1.27 10.61 1.134 0.1195
68 -70 1.26 11.82 1.22 0.107
70-72 1.29 11.54 1.274 0.112
72 -74 1.2 10.5 1.435 0.1142
74 - 76 1.18 12.57 1.622 0.094
76 - 78 1.12 10.67 1.549 0.105
78- 80 1.19 9.4 1.979 0.126
≥80 0.98 9.75 2.308 0.101
divide based on their incentive requesting or their level of consumption.
9.4.1 Elasticity for Different Consumption Level
In this subsection customers segmentation based on different load levels is illustrated.
HVAC consumption is highly related to its thermostat setting, so in this part customers
are divided based on their thermostat settings. Load change and incentive needing for
each group is summarized in Tab. 9.4 for July and Feb., using survey 2 participants.
In Tab. 9.4 although incentive requesting of different groups are similar, but energy
saving and as a result elasticity is different in each group. Power saving is highly related
to average power consumption of each house as it shown in Fig. 9.5. It’s important to
consider this point that elasticity variation is proportional to reward expectation that is
based on survey participant’s response and could include some noise, therefore elasticity
could have smoother pattern and decrease more monopoly as average power consumption
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Table 9.5: Survey2- HVAC elasticity report for combined groups
Feb. Elasticity Load Incentive Average Energy ElasticityTemp. Change (MW/m) change (%)
≤70 0.106 1.187 11.195 72.289 -1.028
70-75 0.11 1.243 11.327 83.412 2.708
≥75 0.107 1.106 10.32 106.94 -0.093
July
≤ 64 0.15 1.36 9.053 112.249 -41.950
65-70 0.239 2.58 10.812 95.867 -7.508
70-74 0.282 2.977 10.544 81.622 9.133
74-78 0.28 3.196 11.424 68.398 8.359
78-80 0.266 3.056 11.476 57.132 2.942
decrease.
Grouping customers based on their temperature settings would lead to more diverse
elasticity values. In some group difference with average elasticity for whole customers is
higher and for some is less. In winter the lowest elasticity belongs to temperature setting
more than 80 degree and in summer the lowest elasticity is for group people of that put
their thermostat on less than 60 degree. Considering this fact the comfort temperature
for most of people is around 72 degree in both season, there is obviously high difference
between comfort setting and mentioned ones. Both of these temperature shows that
these people do care more about their comfort than money, so their elasticity is lower
than other groups.
It may be seemed so hard to decompose total HVAC consumption to 9 distinct groups.
Alternative way is to combine groups with each other and make less customer groups. In
winter, since most of group’s elasticity are close to each other, it is better to have only 3
groups, but in summer we try to keep more diversity since elasticity is higher in summer.
9.4.2 Elasticity for different incentive level
We can divide survey respondents into three groups based on their incentive expectation.
1. High contribution group: incentive expectation is less than 10% of monthly bill,
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Table 9.6: Elasticity per customer cooperative segmentation
Device Low contribution Medium contribution High contributionwinter summer winter summer winter summer
HVAC 0.055 0.123 0.106 0.253 0.352 0.499
Lighting 0.326 0.316 0.426 0.458 0.618 0.653
Dishwasher 0.156 0.143 0.2 0.217 0.217 0.253
Washer/Dryer 0.209 0.197 0.297 0.297 0.381 0.379
2. Medium contribution group: incentive expectation is between 10%-15% of monthly
bill,
3. Low contribution group: incentive expectation is more than 20% of monthly bill.
Elasticity for each group in summer and winter based on survey 2 data is listed in Tab. 9.6.
There is considerable difference between the elasticity of each group for each appliance.
For HVAC, this difference is critical. In the peak of summer (depending on region),
HVAC may count for as much as 50% of total load. Targeting a group with elasticity
of 0.5 at this time could make an important difference in the IBDR program design and
implementation.
In Fig. 9.6, the load change for each customer group by IBDR is shown for one day. The
DR program in all cases is the same, a two degree change in thermostat setting, turning
extra lights off and shifting washing device from peak to off peak time in return for
some incentive. Load change is close for each group since the same type of DR program
is applied for each group; however, there is some differences between results. These
differences arise from variations in parameters that are used to simulate load profile.
Thermostat setting in the high contribution group is lower (in summer) than other groups.
Therefore, the load reduction from a 2 degree thermostat setting change is higher in this
group. The required incentive at each hour according to elasticity of each group is shown
in Fig. 9.7.
As it is shown, there is significant difference between incentive expectation for similar
load change. Fig. 9.7 could simply shows huge potential of saving, if appropriate customer
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clustering could be done. In other words, if we could target right group pf customers,
with right amount of incentive, significant financial difference could be achieved.
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Figure 9.6: Load change in each customer group
min
Figure 9.7: Required incentive for each customer group
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10 Effect of Customer Classification on
IBDR program
In this chapter, IB elasticity is considered for the proposed IBDR program to understand
how elasticity estimation affects results. Estimated elasticity is specific to IBDR programs
and is calculated based on the main appliances in each residence instead of aggregated
across all residential customers. The motivation is to not only evaluate IB elasticity
vs. PB elasticity but also to consider the individual importance load types. In addition,
customer classification is used to improve modeling precision. Elasticity has been typically
considered across broad customer groups only, such as, the residential, commercial and
industrial sectors. This ignores potentially valuable information that could be used to
improve accuracy. In this chapter, customers are classified based on surveys of their
willingness to participate in IBDR programs and also their nominal HVAC thermostat
settings. IB based elasticity is examined under both low and high penetration of RER
scenarios.
10.1 IBDR Design using IB Elasticity
In this study, the proposed IBDR formula in chapter 3 is modified to consider individual






[(Dbt −∆D̄bt)(P 0b − LMPbt)−∆D̄btP incbt ] (10.1)
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∆D̄bt = ∆DRbt + ∆DCbt + ∆DIbt (10.2a)
∆DCbt = εCP incbt (10.2b)
∆DC minbt ≤ ∆DCbt ≤ ∆DC maxbt (10.2c)
∆DIbt = εIP incbt (10.2d)










∆DR minbtk ≤ ∆D
R
btk
≤ ∆DR maxbtk (10.2h)
Equation (10.1) is valid over the time that IBDR is requested. The load change in (10.1)
is a summation of the various customer responses. Each type has a range of load change
and specific elasticity value. Elasticity represents the relation between the incentive
payment and the load reduction. Parameter M indicates the time that DR is applied
and can be either fixed or optimized as developed in chapter 3. In (10.2f), residential
load change is a summation of the various appliances in the home and different thresholds
for consumption modification are considered for each. The residential customer response
can be model separately for each appliance using an appliance based elasticity as shown
in (10.2g). Customer segmentation can also further segment response to achieve more
accurate results. Equations (10.2f) and (10.2g) are modified to (10.3a) and (10.3b),













Table 10.1: Elasticity values for scenario 1
Time Period/ Load Type Residential Commercial Industrial
Day 0.1 0.15 0.15
Night 0.07 0.01 0.01
Table 10.2: Elasticity values for scenario 2
Time Period/ Appliance HVAC Lighting Washing device
Winter 0.1 0.42 0.27
Summer 0.21 0.45 0.23
10.2 Residential Incentive Based Elasticity
To evaluate the effects of new elasticity values on IBDR performance under low pen-
etration of RERs, three scenarios are examined. First, an average price based elastic-
ity is used within the residential, commercial and small industrial sectors. Second, an
appliance-incentive based elasticity is used for each season in the residential part. Third,
the residential customers are classified based on their willingness to participate and abil-
ity to contribute toward the IBDR program. Elasticity values for each scenario are shown
in Tab. 10.1 to Tab. 10.3.
For the case of high RER production, one more scenario is studied. Customers are
divided based on their thermostat setting to three groups: thermostat settings below 70,
between 70-75 and above 75 degrees in either summer or winter. The elasticity for each
Table 10.3: Elasticity values for scenario 3
Customer Group/ Appliance HVAC Lighting Washing device
Winter
Low contribution 0.055 0.38 0.4
Medium contribution 0.1 0.45 0.59
High contribution 0.35 0.48 0.7
Customer Group/ Appliance HVAC Lighting Washing device
Summer
Low contribution 0.12 0.28 0.35
Medium contribution 0.25 0.32 0.59
High contribution 0.65 0.35 0.65
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Table 10.4: Elasticity values for scenario 4
Customer Group/ Appliance HVAC Lighting Washing device
Winter
Temp. Group 1 0.1
0.42 0.27Temp. Group 2 0.11
Temp. Group 3 0.09
Customer Group/ Appliance HVAC Lighting Washing device
Summer
Temp. Group 1 0.17
0.45 0.23Temp. Group 2 0.257
Temp. Group 3 0.3
grouping is shown in Tab. 10.4.
10.3 Results of IBDR for Base Case data of WECC
The appliance-incentive based elasticity of customers impact on the IBDR program is
analyzed under low penetration of RERs with the base case data of WECC 240-bus
system. Fig. 10.1 and Fig. 10.2 show load change and required incentive payments for
each scenario in the various regions of WECC during the summer.
The required incentive for scenario 1 is higher than the others but results in significantly
Figure 10.1: Load change for different scenarios in WECC
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Figure 10.2: Incentive payment for different scenarios in WECC
lower load reduction. The reason is without targeting the incentive carefully the LSE has
to provide greater incentives to more customers. Scenario 3 has the best performance
as it obtains the most load change while paying the least incentive. This verifies the
value of customer classification to target the most receptive group of customers to a DR
program. The different in load changes under each scenario result in different benefits
for both the LSEs and customers as shown in Fig. 10.3 and Fig. 10.4. Scenario 1 brings
the least benefit and scenario 3 leads to the highest benefit for all participants. LSEs
additional profit increases by as much as a factor 10 times in some regions under scenario
3. Customer saving is also significantly higher, which suggests all DR participants can
gain using a more sophisticated IBDR design.
In addition to benefits for LSEs and customers, the proposed IBDR program has an
considerable impact on peak prices. Fig. 10.5 shows the LMP profile during one week
in August, including scenario 4 now. As shown, scenario 2 and 3 not only have better
performance relative to case 1 but they can reduce the price to during the cheapest weak
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Figure 10.3: Percentage of LSE benefit by different IBDR scenario
of the month.
Fig. 10.6 shows LMP profile in one day of July after each IBDR scenario. Scenario
1 has the least effect and scenario 3 has the highest effect on market price as it was
expected. These Figures verifies the effect of customer classification on DR design which
could bring more benefit for all participants and in addition has better effect on peak
shaving of price.
10.4 Sensitivity of LSE Benefit to Elasticity Values
An interesting point in Fig. 10.3 is that although there is a considerable difference in load
change under scenario 2 or 3, LSEs benefits are similar in both cases. In other words,
although scenario 3 has higher elasticity value (for the high and medium contribution
group) and brings more load change with less incentive payments, it does not bring
significantly higher benefit for LSEs. To illustrate, the sensitivity of LSE benefit to
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Figure 10.4: Percentage of Customer saving by different IBDR scenario
elasticity is calculated and plotted in Fig. 10.7 and Fig. 10.8 for summer and winter,
respectively. Note for higher elasticity (larger than 0.3), LSE benefit is less sensitive to the
elasticity value even though it continues to gain some benefit from higher elasticity. The
advantage of customer grouping is more clear when the ability to pay incentives is limited.
In this case, targeting the high contribution of customers could lead to significantly more
load modification with the same amount of incentive relative to average elasticity for all
customers.
10.5 Results of IBDR under High Level of RER
In this section, effects of customer classification and using appliance-incentive based elas-
ticity are studied assuming high penetration of RER. Fig. 10.9 and Fig. 10.10 show the
effect of each DR scenario on LSE benefit in spring and fall for 4 regions in California.
The results are shown based on the percentage of benefit change compare with low renew-
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Figure 10.5: LMP profile in one week of August after each DR scenario
able production and no DR. The greatest benefit arises under scenarios 3 and 4. DR of
scenario 3 group customer based on incentive expectation has the most benefit followed
closely by grouping considering thermostat setting. These results verify the need and ef-
fect of customer classification on IBDR design. Customer grouping should lead to higher
profit for participants under either low or high RER production. Customer segmentation
is helpful to design right type of DR for each customer group and consequently increase
benefits.
Tab. 10.5 shows the LSE’s net revenue per total load in winter and summer for selected
regions. Revenue after renewable expansion and by using different DR scenarios is com-
pared. LSEs would have the highest revenue if they classify customers based on their
incentive request and contribution level to IBDR program. The revenue gain for scenario
3 is as much as 3 times higher relative to using a simple average price based elasticity as
in scenario 1.
To illustrate LSE benefit change under each DR scenario, Tab. 10.6 shows the total
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Figure 10.6: LMP profile in one day of July under each DR scenario
Table 10.5: LSE net revenue per unit load under different DR scenarios
Winter After expansion DR 1 DR 2 DR 3 DR 4
Fresno $4.33 $8.46 $8.60 $15.98 $10.11
Cnt. Coast $5.00 $7.79 $10.06 $17.31 $12.33
PG&E $6.90 $15.62 $22.81 $33.60 $24.94
Northwest $2.18 $4.08 $6.09 $24.37 $18.82
Summer
PG&E $46.27 $52.82 $59.77 $136.58 $62.34
LADWP $12.68 $16.69 $15.08 $26.45 $22.25
SCE $14.42 $17.87 $19.80 $30.11 $22.69
SMUD $16.08 $15.32 $15.78 $39.72 $32.51
amount of incentive payments and load change in different seasons of the year. In general,
scenario 1 requires highest incentive for each MW of load change. Using appliance-
incentive based elasticity allows a little bit of improvement. The best scenarios are again
scenario 3 and 4. This table provides some insight on how the scenarios benefit LSEs.
In addition to the more benefit that using incentive-appliance based elasticity and
customer grouping could bring for utilities and customers, another motivation for using
these types of DR under high penetration of RERs is reducing price variation. The easiest
way to reduce price variation is load shifting, which is easier with an understanding of
customer appliance use. Washing devices are the primary shiftable loads, which can
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Figure 10.7: LSE benefit as a function of demand elasticity during summer
Figure 10.8: LSE benefit as a a function of demand elasticity during winter
easily be shifted to the cheaper times of the day. Knowing the elasticity of customers
and their incentive expectation allows these loads to be targeted. HVAC consumption
is both reducible and shiftable. People can change their thermostat setting during peak
times to reduce consumption. Still, one they return to a normal setting, HVAC would
consume more electricity for some time. This extra needed power is called “return of
load” and acts as shiftable load in the system. In this study, the return of load for HVAC
is calculated based on temperature data for different regions in the WECC. In Fig. 10.11
and Fig. 10.12, the effect of proposed DR scenarios are shown for one day in summer and
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Figure 10.9: LSE benefit change under different DR scenarios in spring
fall, respectively.
As shown, using appliance based elasticity, and more importantly customer classifica-
tion, not only reduces price at peak hours but also increases the cheaper price during
off peak period. Notably in the fall, when renewable expansion leads to many negative
LMP hours, load shifting eliminates many such hours and could allow better use of wind
turbine generators. This effect is shown in Fig. 10.12.
Tab. 10.7 shows statistical variation of LMP in San Diego area for different months
of the year. Customer classification and load shifting, under scenarios 3 and 4, has
considerable impact on reducing peak prices and volatility.
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Table 10.6: Total load change and incentive payments in each season
Region
Winter Spring
DR 1 DR 2 DR 3 DR 4 DR 1 DR 2 DR 3 DR 4
Southwest
5,219 5,649 10,020 7,795 5,887 5,830 10,519 7,757
$13,085 $10,284 $8,789 $10,363 $15,444 $14,414 $11,273 $14,706
Bay area
4,532 3,763 5,108 4,912 5,496 3,597 5,070 4,917
$16,067 $11,329 $9,081 $12,958 $18,291 $13,739 $9,632 $15,034
Fresno
2,133 1,412 1,522 1,450 2,922 1,591 1,901 1,757
$6,812 $5,956 $3,840 $5,163 $8,089 $7,459 $4,518 $6,391
Nevada
3,493 1,778 2,088 1,972 3,807 1,751 2,087 2,017
$10,772 $7,708 $6,379 $6,772 $13,521 $7,686 $7,873 $7,214
Region Summer Fall
Southwest
12,452 11,315 20,706 15,682 5,528 4,719 8,095 6,727
$31,435 $29,161 $21,600 $28,187 $13,832 $12,680 $10,391 $12,980
Bay area
7,674 5,624 9,125 8,835 6,019 3,696 4,195 4,008
$20,656 $18,513 $12,119 $18,313 $19,182 $15,047 $9,847 $14,183
Fresno
5,005 3,114 3,897 3,630 1,713 1,026 1,086 1,023
$14,835 $12,513 $7,835 $11,326 $8,450 $6,358 $4,288 $6,642
Nevada
7,701 3,399 4,336 4,209 2,000 1,111 1,321 1,271
$20,938 $16,655 $12,942 $16,708 $7,567 $5,417 $4,787 $6,044
Table 10.7: Monthly variation of LMP in San Diego area under different DR scenarios
Month May June
Price variation Min. Max. STD Min. Max. STD
After expansion 4.52 86.60 11.74 8.31 86.60 13.09
DR 1 4.52 65.32 10.81 8.31 60.29 10.95
DR 2 5.04 72.07 10.11 10.74 63.89 10.08
DR 3 15.32 67.72 8.01 17.50 58.24 7.78
DR 4 15.78 68.34 8.97 15.80 61.72 8.97
Month November December
Price variation Min. Max. STD Min. Max. STD
After expansion 8.26 58.20 10.68 8.33 76.48 13.87
DR 1 8.26 49.90 9.01 8.33 56.73 10.82
DR 2 8.32 53.00 8.86 12.21 60.48 9.20
DR 3 17.39 48.42 4.65 18.81 57.84 8.78
DR 4 17.39 50.42 5.50 18.81 56.18 8.26
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Figure 10.10: LSE benefit change by different DR scenarios in fall
Figure 10.11: LMP variation after different DR scenarios in Southwest region, July
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Figure 10.12: LMP variation after different DR scenarios in Idaho during November
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11 Conclusions
In this work, a demand response framework combining TOU and IBDR programs has
been developed. The comprehensive model explores the potential of both reward and
punishment in DR tariffs. A method to design optimum peak and off peak tariffs utilizing
self and cross elasticity is developed. For the IBDR program, a novel formulation for
the optimal reward is proposed. The optimization determines not only the appropriate
incentive payment and load reduction but also when to activate the IBDR program. Two
different types of thresholds for requesting load response are considered: a constant level
above the market price and an optimal threshold. Results show that while the constant
threshold performs well at high load times, the variable threshold is more effective under
more normal conditions. Customer satisfaction should be a determining factor since not
only total savings is important but also the frequency for which they need to change their
consumption relates closely to their convenience. From this point-of-view, the variable
threshold with appropriate constraints is more desirable.
A successful demand response program can significantly reduce electricity prices, im-
prove system reliability and reduce price volatility. A case study using representative
data from the WECC 240-bus reduced model demonstrates the effects of the proposed
DR programs on reducing price variation and peak demand considering both load shift-
ing and load reduction. Consequently, total generation cost reduce significantly and all
participants in market benefit. Customer savings consists of both the incentives received
and the resulting lower prices, which together yield significant savings. From the ISO
point-of-view, an interesting point is that although the percentage of time for DR re-
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quests is less than 10% in each region, there is considerable reduction in price volatility
and average LMP across all regions.
Application of the IBDR in emergency situations is also analyzed. During generator
outages, the LMP may increase with system wide effects. In order to avoid price changes,
LSEs can implement an IBDR over a short period of time to decrease load. The pro-
posed IBDR program tests on the WECC model shows significant LMP reduction during
outages. An important aspect of the program is that the DR program only needs to be
implemented in a few regions and for a small portion of customers to result in significant
savings. During outage conditions, time may be a key factor, therefore, an economic
ranking of generators was introduced to quickly identify needed DR. Results show that
electrical distance between a generator to the more expensive generators can act as proxy
for the price impact of an outage.
The effect of small customer’s DR under high penetration of RERs is analyzed. LMP
variation after renewable expansion becomes highly correlated with renewable intermit-
tent. As a result, a TOU program is difficult to successfully implement; however, results
show IBDR can diminish most sharp price changes during peak load. To model the risk
that is associated with renewable forecast uncertainty, a robust optimization is designed
considering market price and elasticity variation. A DOE approach is used to analyze
different scenarios of market price according to renewable forecast errors. Analysis of
the associated market risk using a deterministic approach shows two possible concerns:
unexpected high LMP leading to opportunity loss and unexpected low LMP causing eco-
nomic loss. A comparison between robust and deterministic results shows that although
the LSE loses some benefit using the robust design under normal conditions, even a few
hours of large price deviations can render the robust approach valuable.
Elasticity of residential customers toward IBDR was calculated for different appliances
and for different HVAC thermostat settings, using two nation wide surveys and a Matlab
based load modeling toolbox. Results show customer incentive expectation for lighting
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and washing device is far less than HVAC. Still since HVAC generally has the highest share
of the aggregate load, the resultant load reduction from the HVAC thermostat changes is
higher than from other devices. Due this important role of HVAC load, especially at peak
hours, the HVAC elasticity is analyzed for different thermostat settings. Incentive ex-
pectation across temperature groups are close, based on survey data, therefore, elasticity
mainly depends on load change. Considering the relationship between load change and
average power consumption, the elasticity of HVAC decreases as average power increases.
In addition, customers are clustered based on their incentive expectation. Elasticity of
each group is calculated and compared with the average. There is a significant difference
between the elasticity of low and high contribution classes. This type of classification
could help utilities and load aggregators target customers with the appropriate incentive
to achieve required load response. This type of approach could also help achieve higher
levels of response at lower cost while motivating greater customer participation.
Next, it was demonstrated how the right information about incentive based elastic-
ity of customers can improve DR performance. Two cases of incentive based elasticity
are compared with a standard price based elasticity assumption. An appliance based
elasticity is considered for residential customers in order to reflect the various roles of
each device daily use. Second, customers are classified according to their contribution to
IBDR. These scenarios are tested on data from the WECC 240-bus reduced model for the
whole year. Results show the necessity of accurately accessing IB elasticity with detailed
information of customers, such as, targeted appliances and customers classes. More in-
formation means greater benefit for participants and reductions in peak market prices.
In summary for efficient and economical design of IBDR program, it is necessary to have
appropriate data to allow detailed and accurate information about customer response to
IB programs.
Effect on customer classification and incentive based elasticity on high penetration of
renewable resource is also evaluated. For high renewable generation, four scenarios are
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compared. The effect of using average price based elasticity, appliance and incentive
based elasticity, incentive based elasticity and customer classification based on people
incentive request, and finally customer grouping based on temperature setting at each
house. Using the customer clustering improves the results of load reduction at the peak
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